Matters of course are far more complex. Given the political and legal structure in China, and autonomy of local governments especially after the reform, accepting an agreement is a far cry from implementing its provisions. Despite China's early acceptance of strong patent rights regulations earlier than many developing countries, not only is reverse engineering the rule among Chinese firms, but international firms detecting patent or copyright violations are rarely in a position to challenge them and get the government to initiate action.
 
In fact, this time around, the consequences of implementing the provisions of the agreement relating to trade liberalisation can be extremely damaging, especially for the state owned enterprises primarily created during the pre-reform years. There were 118,000 such firms in China in 1998. Though the contribution of these state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to China's industrial output had fallen from over 75 per cent in 1978 (when economic reform began) to less than 35 per cent in 1995, this was not so much due to the shrinkage of this sector as to the expansion in the rest of the industrial sector consisting of the collective enterprises, the individually owned enterprises, wholly foreign owned firms, and foreign joint ventures.
 
What is significant is that even now the SOEs dominate or even monopolise their chosen areas of operation, which are the capital-intensive, heavy and basic goods industries characterised by lumpy investments and long gestation lags. The significance of the state-owned enterprises comes through in other ways as well. For example, they still constitute the principal source of employment in urban China. In 1995, seven out of ten urban workers were employed in state firms. Such employment does not ensure just a wage, but a range of welfare benefits such as housing, medical care and retirement benefits. Further, state-owned enterprises constitute the primary source of tax revenue for government. In 1995, SOEs produced only 35 per cent of China's industrial output, but contributed 71 per cent of government revenues. Thus, it is not only directly that the SOEs contribute to the government's governance and welfare responsibilities, but indirectly, by providing the latter with the wherewithal to finance its own expenditures.
 
Trade liberalisation, which would subject these units to competition, and financial sector reform, which would make it extremely difficult for them to access the credit so crucial to their survival, mainly threatens these firms. Thus, the terms of WTO entry, if implemented, could spell unemployment and erode standards of living. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, China's Labour Minister Zhang Zuoji stated in a report to the financial and economic committee of the National People's Congress earlier this year, that more than three million workers in China's state-owned enterprises are expected to lose their jobs this year. They would join the six to seven million people who, having been retrenched from state firms, were yet to find new jobs. Zhang noted that, while China would need 24.5 billion yuan ($2.95 billion) this year to provide basic living expenses to laid-off workers, the amount currently available was only 19.5 billion yuan. This problem of inadequate support is bound to intensify if China resorts to massive trade and financial sector liberalisation involving partial retrenchment or closure of public sector units, since there were an estimated 113 million urban workers employed by state owned firms in 1995.
 
It is for this reason that it is hard to believe that China would go ahead with the kind of liberalisation it has promised on a range of fronts. In fact, there are many China watchers who are sceptical. For example the Financial Times quotes Gordon Chang, a lawyer in a Beijing firm, who argues that: "If it (China) really follows through on the agreement, the changes are going to be little short of revolutionary. This leads me to believe that the agreement is not going to be implemented as announced."
 
In the circumstances the view that all developing countries should give in to a more liberal and unequal global order just as China has done may be completely misplaced. China's giving in may be more rhetorical than real. And the competitive threat to developing countries from China, which has been intense in the past, is unlikely to increase after China's entry into the WTO.
 
Unfortunately misplaced views about the implications of China's entry are being aired in India as well, in defence of the position that India should 'learn from China' and not insist on a review of the Uruguay Round and raise too many objections to a new Millenium Round with a far-reaching agenda. But as in the case of developed-country spokespersons, this is just one more ruse to push through their own agenda.