Secondly,
the package offers a number of new concessions for foreign firms and investors.
For example, international automobile manufacturers and banks would be allowed
to offer consumer loans for car purchases, which is a crucial concession given
the high price of automobiles in China relative to incomes. Foreign manufacturers
will also be allowed to distribute their own products imported from abroad
and not be forced to rely on domestic distributors. Above all, foreign firms
are to be provided an important role in the emerging and rapidly growing telecommunications
sector (including internet). The agreement provides for foreign firms to hold
49 per cent of the equity in local ventures for a period of two years and
50 per cent subsequently.
The
third area in which major concessions have been offered is the financial sector.
Thus far foreign banks were allowed to offer their services to foreign companies
operating in China. But under the terms of the agreement they would be allowed
to offer their services to Chinese firms two years after their entry, providing
loans, undertaking currency transactions and servicing their other banking
requirements. Limits on the insurance business undertaken by foreign insurance
companies are also to be gradually dismantled and they are to be allowed to
increase the number and expand the size of their branches as well as enter
new areas such as property. Market access is to be eased and enlarged for
foreign legal and accounting firms as well. Finally foreign brokerage houses
and mutual funds are to be allowed to form joint ventures with Chinese companies,
holding 33 per cent initially and a possible 49 per cent subsequently.
In
return for these substantial concessions, the US has agreed to support China's
claim to WTO membership. But it has not offered very much else. In the contentious
area of textiles, which is a major item in the Chinese export basket, quotas
are to be phased out only by 2005. The US has also reserved for itself the
right to respond in protectionist fashion to what it sees as import surges
in the US market for a period of ten years, and to similarly respond to "dumping"
for a period of 15 years. The experience under the Uruguay Round so far points
to the ease with which such clauses can be converted into protectionist devices
by developed countries.
The
willingness of China, an important developing country exporter which has been
struggling to join the formal multilateral trade framework, to make these
compromises is to an extent understandable. What is less clear is why the
US which, for political reasons, was earlier unwilling to accept even these
terms, has suddenly come round to accepting an agreement which, according
to some reports is not as good as the terms which were on offer and were rejected
in April. Moreover, given the impending Presidential elections and the strong
opposition to Chinese entry among the trade unions, the timing of the agreement
is indeed surprising. The AFL-CIO has vowed to fight the deal, both because
it threatens American jobs as well as goes against America's "democratic principles
and most cherished values". And some local business interests, including the
textile lobby have also sharply attacked the agreement.
If
yet the Clinton administration has chosen to go through with it, it is possibly
because of a strategic concern. It is indeed pointless not integrating an
emerging economic power like China into current and future negotiations on
the world trading system. But, more importantly, the willingness of China
to make crucial concessions in areas like foreign investment and the financial
sector could be an important source of pressure on recalcitrant developing
countries unwilling to agree to start negotiations on investment and services,
as part of a new Round. That could possibly explain the willingness to conclude
an agreement on terms rejected only recently, in time for the ministerial
meet at Seattle. As in the case of patents at the time of the Uruguay Round,
China is implicitly being held up as a model of a developing country with
a reasonable negotiating position.