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Knowledge
and the Asian Challenge |
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Sep
5th 2006, C.P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh |
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According
to official statistics, China continued to grow at a
scorching 10.2 per cent during the first quarter of
2006, as compared with the corresponding period of the
previous year. India closely followed China's performance,
with GDP growing at an estimated 8.4 per cent during
financial year 2005-06. These figures, while concealing
much in terms of the distribution of that growth, keep
alive the fears of the threat from these two Asian giants
to growth in the rest of the world, including the developed
countries.
The threat is seen as particularly serious because of
indications that exports are an important source of
dynamism in these countries and that ‘knowledge capital”
has come to play a crucial role in their export dynamism.
In both countries the ratio of exports of goods and
services to GDP has risen quite sharply in recent years
(Chart 1). In 1978, when China's reform began, that
ratio was more or less the same in India and China,
at around 6.5 per cent. Since then the figure has risen
sharply in China, to touch 34 per cent in 2004, and
much more slowly in India to just above 19 per cent.
While much of the expansion in exports in the Chinese
case has been on account of exports of manufactured
goods, that in the case of India has been principally
on account of services (Chart 2). Between 1985 and 1995,
the ratio of goods exports to GDP rose from around 8
to 18 per cent in the case of China and from 4 to 9
per cent in the case of India. But after that, while
the figure for China shot up to 26.7 per cent in 2003,
it remained short of 10 per cent in the case of India.
Relative to GDP, it is the growth in services exports
that explains India's more moderate trade success. Add
to this the important role of private transfers, or
remittances from non-resident Indians and the relative
resilience of the current account of India's balance
of payments in the context of a rising oil import bill
is explained.
Larger exports and/or a higher rate of expansion of
exports can stimulate growth because of positive net
exports or a trade surplus that serves as the demand
stimulus and inducement to invest for an individual
country. Even if not recording a large trade surplus,
successful engagement in trade allows a country to dissociate
the structure of domestic supplies from domestic production.
This permits using the possibilities of transformation
through trade to ensure availability of adequate quantities
of commodities crucial to growth. Export revenues may
be crucial in financing imports of specific commodities
that are essential for consumption without running into
balance of payments difficulties. Typical examples of
such commodities are food, machinery and oil.
At the aggregate level, of course, it is only China
that appears truly mercantilist, exporting more than
it imports and accumulating wealth in the form of foreign
reserves. In the year to March 2006, China recorded
a trade balance of $108 billion and a current account
balance of $161 billion, taking its gold and foreign
reserves to a record $875 billion. On the other hand,
India recorded a trade deficit of close to $40 billion
and a current account deficit of $13.3 billion. However,
capital flows, especially portfolio capital flows into
India's debt and equity markets helped it keep reserves
at $145 billion. In sum, the role of net exports as
a trigger for growth appears to be true for China, but
not so for India. But if current transfers into India,
consisting largely of remittances from Indian workers
abroad are treated as a form of services income, than
the deficit on India's balance of trade reduces substantially.
Chart
1 >>
The
rapid expansion of exports has been accompanied by high
rates of growth of GDP, improving the presence of these
two countries in the global economy. Measured in terms
of prices prevailing in 2000, China's share of world
exports of goods and services was 5.8 per cent in 2003
(up from 1.4 per cent in 1978), and though India's share
was just 1 per cent it was up from 0.4 per cent in 1978.
In terms of constant price GDP, China accounted for
4.6 per cent of global GDP in 2003 and India for 1.6
per cent, both up from 0.9 per cent in 1978. A figure
of relevance here is the relative size of GDP in these
countries, measured in terms of purchasing power parity
(PPP) dollars, which is an indicator of the buying power
of the Indian and Chinese populations. Measured in those
terms, China accounts for 13 per cent of global GDP
in 2003 and India for 6 per cent. This compares with
2.9 and 3.6 per cent respectively in 1978. Thus the
rest of the world is benefiting from a growing market
in these countries.
Chart
2 >>
The
role of trade in facilitating growth in the countries,
explains in large part the perception that they threaten
global growth, including that in the OECD countries.
To boot, while China seems to be emerging as the manufacturing
hub of the world, India is proving to be the global
services hub. And each of these countries has an eye
on the terrain occupied by the other. In the circumstance,
evidence such as China's large trade surplus with the
US only strengthens perceptions of a major economic
threat.
Table
1 >>
In
addition, there are reasons to believe that the success
of these countries stems from their ability to exploit
the opportunities created by the new knowledge economy.
Manufacturing areas that the World Bank defines as hi-tech
account for a significant share of China's exports.
As Chart 3 shows, hi-tech exports from China exceed
those from all countries except the USA, including Germany
and Japan. Similarly in the case of India, software
services, identified as hi-tech services account for
a significant share of services exports. IT services
exports are estimated at around $16 billion currently.
What is more, in terms of indicators of technological
competitiveness reported by the National Science Foundation
of the USA, China and India rank well, when compared
to some European countries and many developing countries.
Chart
3 >>
However,
it is necessary to differentiate between knowledge in
the production of goods and services and knowledge for
the production of goods and services. While knowledge
is being applied in production in these countries, the
US still monopolises the control over knowledge. This
comes through from evidence of various kinds.
To start with, even relative to their own GDP, China
and India lag far behind the developed countries in
terms of R&D expenditure. While the figure is close
to 3 per cent in the case of Japan and the United States,
and between 2 and 2.5 per cent in France and Germany,
it stands at 1 per cent or lower in China and India
(Chart 4). According to the UNCTAD's World Investment
Report 2005, individual firms such as Ford, Pfizer,
DaimlerChrysler, Siemens, Toyota and General Motors
each spent more than $5 billion on R&D in 2003.
In comparison, among the developing economies, total
R&D spending exceeded $5 billion only in Brazil,
China, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of
China.
Licensing the use of this knowledge ensures significant
revenues to firms from the USA, far exceeding that received
by other countries (Chart 5). What is noteworthy is
that both receipts and payments of royalties in the
case of the US are in transactions with affiliated firms.
That is, the US is reaping the benefits of its control
over knowledge through transactions conducted with affiliates
abroad (Table 2).
Chart
4 >>
It is for this reason that we need to examine the role
of foreign firms in the export performance of India
and China. According to George Gilboy (Foreign Affairs,
July/August 2004), foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs)
accounted for 55 per cent of China's exports in 2003.
This dominance increases in the case of hi-tech exports.
The share of FFEs in exports of industrial machinery,
which stood at $83 billion in 2003, increased from 35
percent to 79 percent over a decade. While exports of
computer equipment rose from $716 million in 1993 to
$41 billion in 2003, the FFEs' share rose from 74 percent
to 92 percent. Similarly, the share of FFEs in China's
electronics and telecom exports ($89 billion in 2003),
rose from 45 percent to 74 percent.
The situation appears to be similar in the case of IT
services exports from India. According to NASSCOM, offshore
operations of global IT majors accounted for 10-15 per
cent of IT services and BPO exports and captive BPO
units accounted for 50 per cent of BPO exports. Further,
MNC-owned captive units have been scaling up their operations
steadily with the headcount forecast to grow by at least
30 per cent this year.
Table
2 >>
Thus, foreign firms with control over knowledge appear
to be exploiting the availability of skilled and educated
labour in these countries. What is more, there is evidence
that the best talent is being used to strengthen control
over knowledge. According to the National Science Foundation,
out of the approximately 280,000 foreign graduate students
enrolled in US universities, 63,013 were from India
and 50,796 from China. Further, out of the 37,608 non-US
citizen who received doctoral degrees in 2002-03, 10,089
were from China and 3,238 from India. Two thirds of
these students had definite plans to stay back in the
US and another 20-25 per cent was considering the possibility
of staying back. The US has become a destination for
some of the best talent from these two countries.
Finally, even to the extent that talent remains in the
developing countries, there are signs that through a
process of internationalisation of R&D operations,
transnational firms are exploiting that talent to retain
control over knowledge. According to the UNCTAD's World
Investment Report 2005, transnational corporations (TNCs)
account for at least 70 per cent of global business
R&D. In 2002, the top 700 R&D spenders reported
R&D expenditures of more than $300 billion. A rising
share of these companies' R&D expenditures are undertaken
in developing countries. Between 1994 and 2002, the
developing-country share of all overseas R&D by
US TNCs increased from 7.5 per cent to 13 per cent.
As of now, more than half of the world's top R&D
spenders conduct R&D activities in developing countries.
In India, leading firms like Intel, Microsoft and Adobe
have R&D operations within the country. In China
too, the trend is clearly visible. According to the
Wall Street Journal, almost all the global giants in
automobile, telecommunications technology, computer,
software, machinery, electronics, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals
and other major industries have made R&D investments
in China. These companies include General Electric (GE),
General Motors, P&G, Unilever, Microsoft, Intel,
IBM, Motorola, Siemens, Ericsson, Nortel, AT&T,
Lucent Bell and Samsung;
All these developments suggest that even while China
and India are important bases for knowledge-based production
of exportable goods and sources, important beneficiaries
of this development are transnationals from the developed
countries, even if not the mass of the workers in these
countries who fear job losses. This implies that as
yet countries like India and China are locations that
serve as instruments of battle for transnational firms.
The war among the latter results in strategies that
may be threatening extant or future employment in the
developed countries. But when faced with that prospect
it is not India and China that need to be feared by
developed country citizens, but their-own home-grown
transnationals who have taken wing.
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