Somewhere
around the 1980s, public ownership of airline companies began to be viewed
with aspersion in many developed countries. State ownership of national
carriers was deemed to be unnecessary and inefficient, breeding lack of
competition and high costs, and reducing the flexibility required to be
internationally competitive. In keeping with times, over the 1980s and
early 1990s, most such "national carriers" were privatised, and even when
governments retained a share, it was rarely sufficient for management
control.
At the same
time, it also became fashionable to decry "over-regulation" in the airline
industry, and deregulation was touted as the best means to increase
competition and lower air ticket prices for consumers. The more
deregulated market of the United States was frequently held up as an
example to Europe and other developed regions, of how deregulation could
provide leaner, more efficient and therefore cheaper, flight services. (Of
course, those who had to travel regularly on the US domestic flights with
minimal and grudging service, old and rackety planes and casual safety
procedures, realised that there was a definite downside to all this.) By
the late 1990s, the skies over Europe too had been substantially
deregulated, and most other developed countries in other regions were
rapidly following suit.
Strange to say, these moves did not appear to make air travel all that
much cheaper, more pleasant, or even safer. In fact, even though the
volume of passenger traffic increased exponentially in the decade of the
1990s, these moves did not even make airline companies themselves more
profitable. Most of the major international airlines have experienced
quite significant financial problems in the course of the past five years,
and by early this year the situation became quite acute. The airline
industry was one of the worst afflicted by the world economic recession,
in particular the slowdown of the US economy, with several carriers being
close to breaking point.
And of course, the last month has been nightmarish for the industry. After
September 11, the airlines have had to cope with drops in passenger
traffic of up to 40 per cent, huge increases in insurance premia, and so
on, all of which have thrown their fragile finances into almost complete
disarray. The response in terms of cutting jobs has been equally swift.
The American-based airlines have already cut more than a hundred thousand
jobs, while several European airlines have announced job losses of several
thousand each.
In the face of this crisis, suddenly, airline company executives have
rediscovered the hitherto discreet charms of state intervention.
Throughout the developed world, and especially in the United States, there
have been vociferous demands for government intervention and rescue
packages for troubled airline companies. And suddenly the governments too,
no longer seem so convinced of the advantages of deregulation and
distancing.
In the US, for example, when executives gave out dire
warnings of imminent bankruptcies, a bailout legislation was rushed
through Congress by overwhelming margins and rapidly endorsed by the Bush
administration. Along with $10 billion in loan guarantees, the airlines
were awarded $5 billion in cash to cover their immediate losses. This
amount is to be administered by an Air Transportation Stabilization Board,
with enormous powers to decide which companies get how much money and on
what terms.