As we have argued earlier
in this column an examination of the salary bill of the government
suggests that there is little to be gained in terms of resources released
by this process. There are currently close to 3.5 million employees in
government employment. However, of these 2.2 million are employed in the
Railways and the postal department, both of which undertake a huge task
given the size of the country, and are known to have accomplished their
task creditably given the complexities involved. Another, 50,000 are
employed in the departments of atomic energy and space, which like defence
need to be kept out of the downsizing initiatives of the finance ministry.
That implies that Mr. Sinha's downsizing exercise can apply only to around
1.2 million employees earning Rs. 11,459 crore by way of pay and
allowances. Even if he successfully implements his downsizing commitment
made in last year's budget speech, the amount saved in a single year would
work out to just 0.08 per cent of total revenue expenditure, making the 10
per cent saving to be garnered in 5 years just 0.4 per cent of total
revenue expenditure.
The recently announced VRS
scheme can be seen, therefore, as an effort to advance further in this
direction. It is targeted at government employees in the "surplus pool"
resulting from reorganisation of existing departments and closure of
departments identified as superfluous. These employees are to be offered a VRS package consisting of an ex-gratia payment equal to 35 days of
emoluments (basic pay plus dearness allowance) for each completed year of
services and 25 days for each year of the balance service remaining until
retirement age. The payment will be subject to a minimum of 250 days'
emoluments or Rs. 25,000, whichever is higher, and a maximum set by a
ceiling of 33 years for computation of the payment. If those declared
surplus do not accept the scheme, they would be retrenched if not
redeployed in one-year.
On the surface the package
appears attractive and could result in a substantial one-time payment from
the State's coffers if taken up by large numbers. Further, offering a
larger number of days of compensation for years of service already
completed than for years still due to be completed will bias acceptance in
favour of older employees, making the average compensation paid much
higher. Given the small savings that seems to result from employee
reduction, it is unclear whether this scheme is rational at all. Its
primary purpose appears to be to declare that the government is "committed" to expenditure reduction and fiscal reform, irrespective of
the net benefit of the initiative.
What accounts for this
desperation to be seen as being truly "reformist" on the eve of the
budget. The real explanation seems to be a need to make the same reformist
tag stick when it comes to privatisation. Starting with Modern Foods and BALCO, the government has been facing substantial opposition to its
"strategic disinvestment" drive, aimed at transferring management control
of PSUs to private agents at a small price. There have been two
allegations which the drive has generated: first, that in its desperation
to sell large enough volumes of PSU shares for budgetary reasons the
government has been forced to offer private agents a concession in the
form of management control in return for acquisition of as little as 25
per cent of the shares at extremely low prices; and, second, that in the
rush for acquisition of profitable PSU shares this has generated in the
private sector, non-economic considerations have influenced and distorted
the process.
The disinvestments of VSNL
and the petro-marketing firm IBP Co. Ltd., were indeed instances of the
big-ticket privatisation drive of the NDA government. The irrationality of
the process of setting a reservation price based on questionable
assumptions and accepting the highest bid among those falling above this
price comes through in both these cases. This is most obvious in the case
of IBP. IOC won control over IBP with a bid of Rs. 1153.68 for the 33.58
per cent stake, which is close to three-and-a-half times the reserve
price. Was IOC's bid irrational, or was it the reservation price and the
price of just Rs. 595 crore offered by the second highest bidder Shell?
Sections of the financial media have been putting out speculative, and
possibly planted, reports that this occurred because the Petroleum
Minister forced IOC to more than double its bid in order to prevent the
company going to private hands. The fact of the matter is that IOC is not
only willing to stick to its commitment, but has also raised objections
against the Disinvestment Ministry's decision to keep IOC out of the round
of bidding for HPCL and BPCL on the specious grounds that in the event of
its victory it would become a monopoly in the petroleum area.
The argument is specious
for a number of reasons. First, in capital intensive areas like
petrochemicals a high degree of oligopoly, even if not monopoly, is the
norm. And collusion between oligopolists, which is common in the oil
industry, can yield results similar to those in situations of monopoly.
Second, since the divestment of HPCL and BPCL are to occur only after the
administered price mechanism is dismantled, import prices would set limits
to the prices which can be charged by domestic players. Finally, as IOC
itself has been quick to point out, in other areas, such as the divestment
of petrochemical giant IPCL, players like Reliance have not been kept out
even though it would enjoy a position of monopoly in many products if it
wins the bid for that company. Clearly, the effort to keep out IOC is
driven by the Disinvestment Ministry's desire to save itself the
embarrassment of receiving a quote which makes nonsense of its reservation
price and the price offered by private bidders who tend to win the bid.
The results that occur when
private players are the sole bidders is clear in a case like VSNL. The
government had fixed a reserve price of Rs. 1218.38 crore for the 25 per
cent stake being divested in VSNL. The VSNL stake was handed over to
Panatone Finvest, a Tata group company, which made a bid of Rs. 1439.25
crore amounting to Rs. 202 per share. Reliance, Tata's competitor in this
case reportedly bid Rs. 1346.25 crore. Are these rational offers? They
would appear to be so when measured against the prevailing market price of
VSNL shares. But interestingly, since sale at a higher-than-market price
would require the bidder to make an open offer to individual shareholders
of the company to purchase their shares at the price offered for the stake
divested by the government, public sector shares have perked up in the
markets. On the day when the results of IOC's bid was announced, the share
prices of IBP rose by 20 per cent. This was to be expected since
shareholders already had the option of receiving a premium from IOC. But
what is interesting is that simultaneously the shares of IOC and of BPCL
and HPCL also shot up. That is, the market was accepting the explicit and
implicit valuation that IOC has made of the shares of petroleum companies.
If the market was wrong in
doing so, there was no reason to believe that the original valuation it
held was right either. On the other hand if it was right, the influence
that prevailing stock prices have on the valuation process is indeed
irrational and could be exploited to those who want to divest or acquire
PSU shares at bargain prices.
Put simply, even if we
ignore the many arguments against privatisation, the manner in which
divestment is occurring is clearly distorted. There could be one or a
combination of two explanations for this. First, the government's
desperation to find resources for its budget is pushing it to court
private buyers with bargain prices, given its emphasis on the immediate
benefit of garnering budgetary resources and refusal to recognise the long
term loss involved for the exchequer. Second, factors other than firm
level or social rationality could be driving the process. In either case,
opposition to the accelerated privatisation thrust is bound to be intense.
It is possibly in an effort to deflect or dilute such opposition that the
government chose to combine the disinvestments announcement with other
unrelated "reform measures", so as to cloak a faulty process in the garb
of economic reform and use that to defend the decision.