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How is Indian Industry Faring? |
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Sep
21st 2004, C.P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh |
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With
outsourcing of services emerging the employment issue
of the times, the performance of India's services sector
is under scrutiny. In a recent article in the Financial
Times (September 1, 2004), Stephen Roach, the chief
economist of Morgan Stanley declared: ''The impetus
that services have given to India's growth has been
… impressive. The services portion of India's GDP increased
from 40.6 per cent in 1990 to 50.8 per cent in 2003
– accounting for 62 per cent of the cumulative increase
in GDP.''
There is one important problem with such an assessment.
It often tends to generalise the dynamism, albeit from
a small base, of IT-enabled and software services to
the services sector as a whole. As Table
1 indicates, the services share in GDP
increased by close to 9 percentage points between 1990-91
and 2001-02, which was much higher than increases during
earlier decades. But a decomposition of that increase
suggests (i) that public administration and defence
was an insignificant contributor to that increase contrary
to the belief in some quarters; and (i) the increase
was almost equally due to Trade, hotels and restaurants,
Transport, storage and communications and Financing,
insurance and real estate.
The first of these features is positive inasmuch as
it indicates that services growth is not just a fall-out
of rising government expenditure. However, the second
suggests that there has been a generalised expansion
in private services. This suggests that assessments
based on the aggregate services figure do not take full
account of the nature of the expansion of the services
sector, separating out the more dynamic elements epitomised
by IT-enabled and financial services from segments that
could reflect the distress-driven spill over into services
activities of a population driven out of land and not
absorbed by industry.
The possibility that the latter is an important influence
on the growth of services arises from the growing evidence
that the commodity producing sectors, viz. agriculture
and manufacturing are either in crisis or performing
poorly. Consider for example the manufacturing component
of the industrial sector. Its share in GDP (Chart
1) has fallen during the second half of
the 1990s and immediately thereafter. And that fall
has characterised both the registered and unregistered
manufacturing sector. Given the fact that the share
of manufacturing in India was already smaller than in
many other successful developing countries, this trend
should give cause for concern. In fact this has led
some economists like Vijay Joshi of Oxford University
to argue (Business Standard September 2, 2004) that
even though India features among the world's top growth
performers during the last two decades, the character
of that growth ''raises doubts about whether it can
be maintained at its present rate''.
However, overall such concern has been limited, if not
altogether missing, for a number of reasons. Post-liberalisation,
there has been a substantial increase in the extent
of ''product innovation'' or availability of new manufactured
goods in the Indian market. International firms that
were permitted limited entry into the Indian market
prior to liberalisation are increasingly visible in
recent times. Profit figures of some Indian manufacturing
firms suggest that they are in robust health. And official
figures of the growth of manufacturing output point
to a substantial degree of buoyancy in the manufacturing
sector.
However, many of these are superficial indicators of
industrial performance. Product innovation could be
accompanied by a decline in domestic value added, because
of a rise in the import intensity of domestic production.
Transnational firms could be displacing domestic production
or acquiring Indian firms rather than contributing to
any net increase in output. And higher profits for a
few may be accompanied by lower profits or losses for
the majority. What is more, the profitability of at
least some of the successful firms could be due to ''other
income'' from activities outside manufacturing, especially
their participation in financial activities.
The real indicators of performance, therefore, are the
actual figures of trends in production. Unfortunately,
close scrutiny of these figures does not provide a satisfactory
answer. As Table
2 shows, the lead indicator of industrial
performance, the Index of Industrial Production, suggests
that after close to two decades of depressed growth,
the trend rate of growth of manufacturing recovered
to 6.1 per cent during the decade starting in 1985-86.
That rate of growth was indeed creditable, even if below
that touched during the decade-and-a-half immediately
after the launch of planned development. Further, this
creditable rate of growth of manufacturing appears to
have been sustained during the subsequent years as well.
This picture of industrial buoyancy is not just corroborated
but strengthened by figures on trends in GDP in the
manufacturing sector. The GDP in registered manufacturing
not only grew at a faster rate (of 6.9 per cent) during
1985/86 to 1994/95 than suggested by the IIP, but that
rate of growth rose by a full percentage point to 7.9
per cent during 1994/95 to 2002-03. This brought it
close to what was achieved during the first three Five
Year Plans. The unregistered manufacturing sector, data
for which is as expected less reliable, is also reported
to have grown in recent years at rates higher than recorded
during any time in India's post-Independence history.
(See
Table 3)
Differences between trends in GDP in registered manufacturing
and in the IIP are to be expected. While initial estimates
of GDP in registered manufacturing for any year are
based on trends in the IIP, these figures are subsequently
revised based on the results of the Annual Survey of
Industries. The latter, because of its methodology and
coverage, is considered a more reliable source of information
on the registered manufacturing sector. Further, it
has been argued in the past that the IIP underestimates
the rate of growth of the registered manufacturing sector,
which tends to be higher when computed from value added
figures provided by the ASI with a lag.
However, there is reason to believe that this alone
cannot explain recent differences in the rates of growth
of manufacturing GDP and the IIP. Table
4 provides a comparison between annual
rates of growth of registered manufacturing based on
value added figures from the ASI deflated by the GDP
deflator and the rates yielded by the IIP. There are
gaps in the series because data problems have resulted
in the information for particular years being excluded
from the time series on principal characteristics of
the factory sector provided by the ASI on its web site.
The available figures suggest that, while it is true
that during most years in the 1980s the IIP yielded
rates of growth which were lower than warranted by the
ASI figures on value added and value of output, in the
1990s the reverse seem to be true and with rather wide
margins in some years.
In sum, the use of alternate series on output and value
added in the registered manufacturing sector yields
results relating to its rate of growth that do not permit
any clear judgement on how Indian industry has been
faring. If the ASI is adopted as a more reliable source,
performance appears to be poor or even pathetic; but
if the IIP or GDP figures are taken, the performance
is indeed good. In the event, we are left with no clarity
about the actual performance of the industrial sector.
However, the point to note is that the stagnation and
decline of the share of GDP contributed by the manufacturing
sector occurs despite the high rates of growth in manufacturing
GDP reflected in figures from the National Accounts
Statistics.
This implies that answering the question as to whether
the stagnation and decline in manufacturing GDP and
the rise in the share of services in GDP is the sign
of a new dynamism associated with a new growth trajectory,
requires assessing more disaggregated data wherever
available. Till such time that such an assessment is
made, optimistic generalisations regarding India's growth
performance and prospects have to be treated with some
scepticism.
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