Secondly, the Uruguay Round went beyond intensifying past efforts at reducing the barriers to trade, by extending GATT disciplines to a range of "sensitive" commodities, like agricultural goods, textiles and apparel, which had hitherto not been subject to the same discipline that applied to the trade in most manufactures. Finally, the Uruguay Round touched on a range of new issues such as trade in services, trade-related intellectual property measures (TRIPs) and trade-related investment measures (TRIMs). Of these "advances" it is the second set in which the results have been particularly disappointing. The virtual standstill in textiles has already been referred to. And in agriculture, even a commentator like trade economist T.N. Srinivasan, who shares the free-trading bent of the WTO, argues that: "Other than bringing agricultural trade under the discipline of GATT rules, there is very little liberalisation. (And even in agricultural trade coming under GATT rules, there are some exceptions. Whereas the subsidisation of exports of manufactures is ruled out, agricultural export subsidies are merely to be reduced but not eliminated, let alone outlawed.) ... Although the reduction of export subsidies and domestic support measures will be of benefit to developing-country exporters, the possible rise in world prices of foodgrains with the reduction in subsidised exports from developed countries will hurt food-importing developing countries ... on balance, agricultural liberalisation is likely to be a washout from the perspective of developing countries." (Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System: From the GATT to the Uruguay Round and the Future, Colarado: Westview Press, 1998).
 
The third area of expected advance has indeed proved to be an area of substantial loss from the point of view of the developing countries, inasmuch as it constrains their efforts at enhancing and widening that competitive advantage, where the limitations are more severe. This impact is principally mediated through the agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which defines those rights and the mechanisms for enforcing them and for dispute settlement by WTO. That agreement has required members to introduce legislation which provides a sovereign guarantee that the patent rights of corporations, wherever acquired and whether relating to products or processes, would be protected. Such patent protection for products and processes is to apply for a period of 20 years in almost all fields of technology. Patent protection for products is especially significant in the chemical and drugs and pharmaceuticals industries, where many developing countries had found alternative processes to replicate products once standardised. But they are proving particularly controversial in areas involving traditional knowledge and life forms. The TRIPs agreement also limits efforts to replicate industrial designs, such as the lay-out designs of integrated circuits. Given the "technological gap" between the developed and developing countries and the concentration of both existing patents and R&D expenditure in the latter, this would be a major constraint on the export competitiveness of domestic firms. This factor, along with the agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), which forecloses governmental efforts to force a degree of indigenisation and domestic linkage on international producers being provided freer access to developing country markets, substantially increases the dependence of developing countries on foreign firms as the medium to win and sustain their foothold in international markets.
 
Overall, there are five aspects which call for attention when examining the gains to developing countries from the implementation of the Uruguay Round proposals: first, gains from increased access to foreign markets have been small and partly neutralised by greater international competition in domestic markets; second, tariff benefits have been outweighed by non-tariff barriers in areas where developing countries have obvious competitive advantages, as is true of labour-intensive sectors where wage costs are an important part of total costs; third, in areas like textiles where developing countries already have a strong international presence, the full benefits of the Round are yet come and would come slowly; fourth, the dependence on transnational firm strategies and the costs and the extent of industrial restructuring would be higher in the wake of the TRIPs agreement, necessitating special strategies in the more-developed developing countries to enhance their technological capabilities based on greater R&D efforts; finally, developing countries would be increasingly hard put to follow conventional "mercantilist" policies like the provision of export subsidies.