While this
overall trend of differential performance and disparity in economic
growth patterns reflects a wide range of factors, many of which are
state-specific, it is also clear that overall macroeconomic policies
of the Central Government have contributed to this. Not only have they
tended to widen existing differentials, they have also not made any
obvious efforts to mitigate such tendencies through countervailing measures.
Thus, there has been no attempt to ensure that the poorest states are
able to grow at faster rates, either direct Central transfers or through
planned public investment which could have generated more such growth
directly and indirectly.
This means
that the poorer states are caught in a vicious circle : low aggregate
incomes means that the tax base is low and the concerned state government
finds it difficult to raise resources. This in turn means that public
expenditure is limited. This also curtails public investment which could
have generated more private investment as well through demand linkages.
Further, it keeps infrastructure development woefully inadequate, which
creates further supply constraints on growth.
In a sense
only a substantive regionally redistributive policy of the Central Government
can break this vicious cycle. Market functioning tends to aggravate
the problem because it directs private investment to those regions with
the higher purchasing power, that is the already richer regions, and
does not of its own provide either resources or increased productive
assets to the underdeveloped regions. Therefore, the effective disappearance
of the planning mechanism and the much greater reliance on market mechanisms
would have added to the tendencies for greater regional inequality.
Further,
greater public investment, especially on infrastructure is essential
to reduce the gap between states and bring the poorer states put of
backwardness. But the 1990s have witnessed a substantial decline in
such public capital expenditure, to less than 2 per cent of GDP in the
late 1990s, and even this pitiful amount has not been distributed across
states in a manner which would reduce the existing inequalities. All
this means that the persistence - and even accentuation - of regional
inequality, must be counted as one of the important failures of the
aggregate economic reform strategy of the 1990s.
This problem
can be addressed not only through purposive public investment and expenditure
which is designed to create and maintain much-needed infrastructure
in the backward states, but also through fiscal transfers. Indeed, the
successive Finance Commissions which decide on the formula or revenue
sharing between the Central Government and the State Governments are
meant to focus particularly on this issue.
Unfortunately,
even here the strategy of successive Central Governments in the 1990s
has been to reduce the amount of resources garnered which must necessarily
be transferred to the states. This has been accomplished through various
devices such as imposing surcharges on income tax (which need not be
shared) rather than raising the basic rates. Further, the loss of revenue
through a range of indirect taxes such as customs duties and the associated
need to reduce domestic excise duties has also operated to reduce the
share of taxes in GDP, which in turn affects the states.
This has
further reduced the manoeuvrability of those state governments which
cannot raise much resources through taxation. And the tendency of Central
Governments to treat any transfers as political largesse being offered
to the party in power at the state level, rather than as a developmental
requirement, has reinforced the tendencies towards inequality.
Thus, a
disaggregated look a the states economic performance indicates
that actual relative growth has been quite different from the picture
that is often presented in the media. All in all, it appears that the
uneven development of states is something that has been accentuated
over the 1990s, and this reflects the effect of the macroeconomic policies
of the Central Government as well.
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