After
Japan and South Korea, China is arguably Asia's next giant. Starting
from a relatively egalitarian base, in terms of asset and income
distribution, created during the years of central planning, it has over
the last two-and-a-half decades grown at a remarkable pace within the
framework of an increasingly market-friendly regime. Per capita income
has increased more than four-fold from $168 in 1980 at 1995 prices to
$727 in 1998. Growth over time was indeed uneven with the annualised
rate of growth of three-year-average GDP figures rising from a little
less than 7 per cent in 1982 to a peak of close to 14 per cent in 1985,
then falling continuously to less than 6 per cent by 1991, rising again
to the above 13 per cent level in 1994 and then falling to less than 8
per cent in 2000. However, the average rate of growth has indeed been
high.
This
increase in per person incomes has occurred in a period when China has
witnessed major reform of its economic policies, starting with reform in
the agricultural sector in 1978. Later, beginning in the mid-1980s,
China opened its economy to inflows of goods and investment. Though a
range of non-tariff barriers still remain in place, the average tariff
rate on imports has fallen from 40 per cent in the early 1990s to 15 per
cent in 2001. Foreign investment flows, which increased from around $1
billion a year to $3.5 billion during the 1980s, mainly as a result of
investment in special economic zones, jumped to $37.5 billion in 1995
and $40.3 billion in 1999. As a result, during the second half of the
1990s, FDI inflows amounted to over 5 per cent of GDP and accounted for
well over 10 per cent of gross capital formation. There does seem to be
evidence of a virtuous link between such FDI flows and China's export
performance. In the event, China's exposure to trade has grown
substantially, with the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP rising from
12 per cent in 1980 to 42 per cent in 2000.
This
and other evidence has been collated in a recently released 800
plus-page study titled "China in the World Economy: The Domestic
Policy Challenges". As is to be expected the study uses the link
between reform, growing trade dependence and high growth as the basis
for two generalisations. First, that if appropriately carried out, a
shift from an interventionist to a market-friendly regime, which
facilitates international integration, is the best route to high growth.
Second, that to overcome the deceleration in growth that China has been
recently experiencing, the best strategy would be intensify the reform
effort. Thus, China's commitments as part of its accession to the WTO,
which go far beyond what many other middle income countries have
adopted, is seen as a positive step forward.
However,
while declaring that China's progress during the economic reform era
is one the great success stories of the post-war era, the study points
to a number of emerging areas of concern in recent performance. These
include the evidence of a loss of dynamism in industry and agriculture,
of growing unemployment and of substantial and rising regional
disparity. Grain production has stagnated in the early- and late 1990s
fell in 2000 to its mid-1990s level. Industrial growth has fallen quite
sharply after 1993. The town and village enterprises, which were a
much-noted source of dynamism in the Chinese economy, are faced with
difficulties. This is of significance, since the TVEs were the largest contributor to
growth in aggregate GDP and employment from the mid-1980s through the
early 1990s, and by 1996 employed 131
million workers, or 28 per cent of the rural workforce. The development
of rural enterprises in turn has transformed rural income generation,
with more than 40 per cent of rural incomes now coming from
non-agricultural activities. Unemployment has
been on the rise, which in its starkest form is reflected in the
phenomenon of "floating" migrant workers in
search of underpaid informal sector employment, estimated at around 100
million. Finally, China's
growth during the 1990s has been accompanied by growing inequality among
its regions. Growth has been most rapid in the coastal provinces,
followed by provinces in the central region, and least rapid in the
western regions.
These
trends have generated some degree of skepticism regarding the evidence
of rapid growth over long period in China as well as a degree of
disillusionment with the reform itself. Surprisingly, it is precisely at
this time that China has decided to accept extremely tough conditions in
terms of trade, foreign investment and financial sector reform as
commitments made in return for WTO access. This, many argue, would not
merely ensure a qualitative shift in the nature of the economic regime
in China, but would accentuate the tendency towards sluggish growth and
weakening welfare.
It
is that argument that the OECD study seeks to challenge. While admitting
that the evidence
is growing that "the important engines that have driven China's
growth in the past have lost their dynamism", the study advances two
theses. First, it holds that even though China is even now as open as
many WTO members and though the depth and breadth of its WTO accession
commitments to increase access to its domestic economy are far greater
than those agreed to by previous adherents to the WTO, China's
accession is merely an important and much-needed milestone in its reform
path rather than a change in direction. Second, to reverse the tendency
towards loss of dynamism and maximize the benefits of the imminent
increase in the openness of its economy, China would have to go further
than its WTO commitments and undertake a set of complementary and
far-reaching reforms. The intent of the study
is clearly to remake China in the image of the developed capitalist
world, if that is possible at all, ostensibly because "to
reap the full benefits of further integration in the world economy, the
Chinese economy must undergo fundamental adjustments."
There have been four elements to the reform in China adopted so far. The
process began with reform in the agricultural sector, which displaced
the pre-reform commune economy. This was replaced with a household based
system in which individual households that leased land from the
collectives were provided autonomy in production decisions. Further,
market forces were given a greater role and government intervention in
the production, pricing and marketing of most crops, excepting grains,
was substantially reduced. Second, the government permitted and sought
to encourage investments outside the state owned industrial sector,
initially in the town and village and other collectively owned
enterprises, then in foreign funded enterprises and more recently in
domestic private enterprises. Third, the government began to liberalise
the import and export trade, by reducing tariffs and easing non-tariff
barriers on a range of exports. Finally, the government has sought to
encourage foreign investment in special economic zones and elsewhere.
Each of these the report argues contributed significantly to increasing
productivity and stimulating income growth. The problem is that more
recently their role as stimuli has substantially waned. The waning of
the effects of these stimuli is attributed in large part to the fact
that the specific form which reform took in each area had positive
effects in particular segments of the concerned sector. But once the
slack in those segments had been taken up, the persistence of dynamism
required not just the intensification of reform in the affected
segments, but the extension of reform to other segments and to
economy-wide policies. While China's WTO access commitments partly do
involve such an extension, they would be inadequate if the benefits from
opening up are to be maximized.
In
agriculture, the loss of dynamism is attributed to the fact that there
are now binding barriers to increases in agricultural productivity.
Fertiliser use is already exceptionally high, pesticide application
cannot be increased because of environmental problems, and there is a
growing shortage of water in many areas. This, according to the study,
implies that agricultural production must diversify away from
land-intensive to labour-intensive products like horticulture. But such
diversification is constrained by the grain procurement system
maintained for food security reasons, which has ostensibly contributed
to growing surpluses, falling prices, reduced rural incomes and
constrained rural consumption.