Until a few weeks ago,
Kemal Dervis was simply a senior employee of the World Bank, a Turkish
economist who had been working with the Bank for the past two decades.
Now he is probably the most powerful man in Turkey, brought in as an
extra-constitutional super Minister invested with sweeping powers over
all economic and financial matters, over the heads of the democratically
elected politicians supposedly in charge.
This is the latest desperate
move on the part of the Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, to placate
financial markets and stem the panic and capital flight that began in
late February. Turkey is no stranger to economic crisis, which have
erupted with even greater frequency and intensity under the liberalised
economic regime which was first ushered in by the government of Turgit
Ozal in the early 1980s.
But this particular
crisis is still quite remarkable, on several counts. To begin with,
it must be remembered that the Turkish economy has been under almost
continuous IMF supervision for several decades now, with no fewer than
seventeen IMF programmes introduced in the country. The latest one,
accompanying a loan of $ 10 billion for three years, began in December
2000 in the midst of yet another episode of capital flight.
Perhaps no other country,
with the exception of the Philippines (another IMF basket case) has
had so much direct control of its economy by the multilateral lending
institutions. To that extent, it is no longer possible for the IMF and
World Bank to argue that they are forced to come in and respond to crises
: the crises that keep occurring are very much a result of the IMF policy
packages and their manner of implementation.
But that is not the
only reason that this particular financial crisis in Turkey is significant.
Two other aspects of it hold important - and disturbing - implications
for other developing countries seeking to make their economic expansion
programmes dependent upon international capital. The first is the extremely
trivial nature of the cause of the crisis.
It is true that the
rate of inflation in Turkey just before the latest crisis was high,
at more than 30 per cent, but it had come down considerably from nearly
70 per cent in the previous decade and year. Turkey had become one of
the quintessential "good boys" among emerging markets, offering major
incentives for foreign capital, offering up major state assets for privatisation,
setting up a currency peg along Argentine lines which linked the Turkish
lira to the US dollar, and imposing high interest rates as part of a
deflationary package.
Financial markets were
actually pleased with this performance, and created a mini-boom in the
Turkish stock market, with market indexes rising from around 5,000 in
mid 1999 to nearly 20,000 in early 2000. This was despite poor showing
of the real economy, which was adversely affected by the major earthquake
of 1999 and the inadequate reconstruction thereafter. Industrial production
continued to be sluggish and real wages were down, but variables such
as these have never really bothered market analysts on the lookout for
temporary booms.
By late 1999, financial
markets were less attracted to Turkey, shifting their portfolios to
other countries at the margin. By now, however, the Turkish economy
was so dependent upon foreign capital inflow that even a slowdown affected
it badly, and led up to the latest IMF programme which started in December
2000, which was being faithfully adhered to by the government. It is
true that the speed of the bank restructuring was not as fast as desired
by the IMF, but certainly, in terms of broad economic conditions, there
were no surprises in January or February this year.
In fact the crisis was
sparked off by something quite different : a simple row between two
important political functionaries, a heated argument between the Prime
Minister and the President about the control of corrupt bankers on February
23. The Prime Minister may have thrown a public tantrum about it to
the press, but still it is hard to imagine that a relatively small incident
like that could spark off such a full blown crisis with such far-reaching
consequences.
Within hours, the Istanbul
stock market fell by 15 per cent, ostensibly because of fears that the
political row could jeopardise the economic reform agreement with the
IMF. Foreign investors pulled cash out, overnight loan rates shot up
to 1,000 percent, and the country's central bank was forced to pump
$4.5 billion, or one-sixth of its cash reserves, into the currency markets
to defend the value of the Turkish lira against a speculative run. Within
two days the main market index fell 18 percent, and another $3 billion
in foreign capital was withdrawn. To discourage speculation, the central
bank raised the overnight interest rate yet again, to 6,100 percent.
The Turkish lira fell more than 35 percent in two days in foreign exchange
markets.
Clearly, desperate measures
were called for, and they began with important bureaucratic heads rolling,
as in the resignation of the Governor of the Central Bank. But nothing
seemed to be good enough to satisfy the wrath of international investors,
who were now discovering all sorts of other (previously unnoticed) flaws
in economic management as the crisis deepened.
Now, in what may be
a final attempt to stem the flow of blood, a most extraordinary announcement
has been made by the 75-year old Prime Minister. A World Bank economist
known to be "market-friendly", Kemal Dervis was brought in from the
World Bank to handle economic management. Initially, government officials
wanted him to become Governor of the Central Bank, but it is reported
that he insisted on a broader portfolio. He will now oversee budget
spending, the central bank and regulation of the banking industry and
capital markets, having almost complete economic powers and able to
overrule all other Ministers.
Already, some Ministers
have resigned in disgust at this state of affairs, and the fate of the
shaky three party coalition that runs the government also seems uncertain.
But that has not deterred either the Prime Minister or the newly appointed
Dervis. At the time of writing, the new "super Minister" was back in
his recent home, Washington, hoping to negotiate an even larger loan
of around $35 billion to prevent or deal with more capital flight.
And in return, it is
likely he will promise even more for private international investors.
He has already indicated that he favours greater privatisation at more
favourable terms for foreigners, more deregulation and private control
over crucial infrastructure industries and utility services, more domestic
deflation and high interest rates - in short, more of the same medicine
which has already been administered to the hapless Turkish economy.
All this may operate
to stave off the immediate crisis, or at least bring it to a temporary
close. But it is now clear that this will not resolve the basic problem
and that another such crisis may recur for equally trivial reasons given
the whimsical nature of international finance. It is equally clear,
as the example not just of Turkey today but of Mexico, Brazil and Russia
yesterday and possibly tomorrow Argentina (which is now facing market
problems simply because it has a similar currency board arrangement)
that no liberalisation can ever be enough. Each bout of liberalisation
will offer only a temporary reprieve, and expose the economy even more
to future crises. And when those crises occur, they wil only be contained
by further liberalisation and further concessions made to implacable
and demanding international capital.
Of course, there would
be a natural limit to all this eventually, if only because after a certain
point there would be few assets left to sell, or few activities left
to liberalise. By then, presumably, material conditions of the people
as a whole would have deteriorated to the point where anyway international
investors would not be interested.
It has all the elements
of a Greek tragedy, except that it is set in Turkey. But what makes
it even more tragic is the realisation that all of this is actually
avoidable, if only people and their governments see through the huge
confidence trick that is currently being played out in the international
financial markets.