Matters came to a head in the third week of January, when tens of thousands of protesters marched into the capital Quito. They were mainly indigenous people to start with, but were rapidly joined by local workers and students. Ecuador's indigenous movement has been a formidable social force for over a decade, but mainly expressed itself in sudden spurts of street-based activity. Beginning with the 1996 elections, the indigenous population had abandoned its traditional policy of shunning the official political system and had participated more actively, thus establishing itself as a significant political force. The current movement also has a charismatic leader - Antonio Vargas - who has been emphasising the imperative need not only for structural redistributive reform but also to reorient macroeconomic policies in favour of the citizenry at large.
 
The public protests brought Quito to a standstill for several days, and finally culminated on Friday, January 21, the day the bill for dollarisation was to be introduced in Congress. Instead, what happened was a takeover of the empty Congress building and the Supreme Court building by several thousand protesters. This was possible also because of an effective revolt in the army, as thousands of soldiers and hundreds of junior officers - up to the rank of Colonel - joined the protesters, in a unique combination of forces. For several hours the protesters declared a "people's parliament", and a new "government of national salvation" was placed in power by this spontaneous uprising. This was headed by a troika composed of the representative of the indigenous people's movement, Antonio Vargas, a military leader, Colonel Gutierrez, and a retired Supreme Court Judge highly respected among the people. It publicly resolved to reverse the economic policies and chart a new course based on the ordinary people's needs, leading to w ild celebrations in the streets.
 
Matters moved swiftly after that, as the international community, and especially the U.S., stepped in to exercise its usual damage limitation and finally effective control. First, the head of the armed forces in Ecuador, General Mendoza, replaced Colonel Gutierrez in the ruling junta. Within the space of five hours, and after only a few calls from Washington D.C., General Mendoza also disbanded the new government and declared that the new President would be elected by Congress. According to local radio reports, U.S. officials had threatened to withdraw aid and to oppose a long-awaited IMF loan, but the General himself said his decision was made to avoid a split in the military and "a futile bloodbath". Congress then elected the earlier Vice-President, Gustavo Noboa, to head the country. The people's movements were suddenly in disarray, and despite the feeling of betrayal, most of the outside protesters left the capital.
 
President Noboa, a former university Professor with little political experience, rapidly showed his own inclination. He pledged to press ahead with his deposed predecessor's plan to dollarise the currency and privatise state assets in the face of continued opposition from trade unions and indigenous organisations. Noboa's first interview was, perhaps predictably, with a foreign news agency, Reuters, in which he announced that "I am strict when it comes to complying with one's duties... Ecuador has to modernise, privatise. But to say that is repetitive. Now we have to really do it... I will use an iron hand when necessary" to push forward with aggressive policies of privatisation and further expenditure control and to crush opposition to these measures. The army officers and soldiers who participated in what is now being termed as the "revolt" are to be tried, and action may well be taken against some of the other protesters as well.
 
The attempt of the government is now to show that it is business (or the lack of it) as usual, and that the focus of economic policy will continue to be that of placating and pleasing the international community, rather than addressing the urgent needs of the local population. Financial markets reacted with predictable relief at this proof that the new President was, after all, one of the boys, and could be trusted not to divert from those policies which are most favourable to it. And the Western media too have been welcoming this restoration of elected democracy, with a Western-trained academic to lead it. But the people's movements remain unconvinced. Vargas announced (from hiding) that the indigenous groups have given the new government a grace period of six months, to show whether the leaders are willing to take measures to improve the lot of the poor. Otherwise, they threaten not just another agitation but a more comprehensive struggle, which could engulf the small Andean country.
 
All this means that the future is still highly uncertain for Ecuador. But while this episode does raise questions about the nature of true democracy and the power of the people's voice, it also points to the sheer diffic ulty of popular movements pressing for social and economic change in the U.S.' backyard. Much may have to change, not only in Ecuador but also in its apparently all-powerful northern neighbour, before the people's movements can be successful in moving towards the granting of basic economic rights to the citizens.