It
is a strategy that seems to have been honed to perfection. When
the Finance Minister rises to present the budget, he launches
on a long and tiresome speech filled with trivial detail. The
intent is to make attention flag. Much of the detail, which fills
Part A of the speech, has little to do with fiscal policy or the
strategy being adopted to mobilise additional resources and allocate
them in directions that reflect a clear agenda for development.
The intent is to obfuscate the nature of the budgetary exercise.
Some of the detail relates to allocations to existing or new programmes
and initiatives with the size of such allocations varying from
a few crore rupees to a few thousand crore. The intent is to prevent
early judgement of whether the allocation to a particular sector,
given its size and requirements, is significant or not.
The minister combines all this with small concessions to some
sections, promises to others and statements that make inconsequential
measures seem important. The intent here is to shift the debate
to whether this is a ''soft'' budget or not. What is kept out
of the speech per se are the numbers that could show that much
of what the minister claims to deliver have not been provided
the resources needed for implementation. The intent seems to be
to divert the nation’s attention by offering some concessions
and wasting time on detail so that it is only after immediate
interest in the budget has waned that the real character of the
budget is revealed.
For those who missed the actual event in real life or on television,
this is a description of the budget speech for 2011-12 delivered
by Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee. He pursued the strategy
to perfection, but he does not seem to have succeeded in full
in realising his objectives. It has not taken long for many to
realise that a fundamental feature of Budget 2011-12 is that it
lacks any focus or strategy whatsoever. As a fiscal package it
is an almost random set of expenditure increases, very few of
which are significant when measured as a ratio to GDP. Above all,
while paying lip service to ''inclusion'', it is seen as delivering
little of it.
The crux of this budget is that the Finance Minister has chosen
to stick to fiscal conservatism and keep aggregate expenditures
in control. Plan expenditures as a ratio of GDP that rose from
4.6 per cent in 2009-10 to 5 per cent in 2010-11 are budgeted
to fall to 4.9 per cent of GDP. And non-plan expenditures that
fell from 11 to 10.4 per cent of GDP during the first two of those
years are budgeted to fall further to 9.1 per cent of GDP. There
is like to be a contraction, if anything, in expenditures.
In fact, the contraction is likely to be even more, since the
Finance Minister would not have the benefit of the additional
Rs.72,000 crore in non-tax revenues relative to budget that he
obtained this year, because of the sale of 3G and wireless broadband
spectrum. Thus, non-tax revenue receipts are estimated to fall
from Rs.220,148 crore in 2010-11 to Rs.125,435 crore in 2011-12.
But what is surprising is that despite that fall, aggregate revenues
are expected to rise marginally from Rs.783,833 crore in 2010-11
to Rs. 789,892 crore in 2011-2012. This is to be ensured by projecting
an increase in tax revenues of more than Rs.100,000 crore from
Rs.563,685 crore to Rs.664,457 crore. This increase is not to
come from additional resource mobilisation. As the budget speech
makes clear, while the Finance Minister expects to garner additional
revenues of Rs. 11,300 crore from indirect taxes, he expects to
lose Rs. 11,500 crore from the concessions he gave on the direct
tax front. So revenues are optimistically expected to increase
because of buoyancy and better compliance.
There is reason, therefore, to suspect that the revenue estimates
for the next year are exaggerated. In all probability the increase
will not be realised and expenditures will have to be cut further.
This kind of enforced austerity which affects expenditures directed
at the poor is expected in a year when the Finance Minister expects
to obtain Rs.40,000 crores by selling public assets under the
garb of ensuring people’s ownership of the public sector. Much
of that money is to be directed at realising fiscal deficit reduction
targets.
In fact if the position taken by the budget on subsidies is an
indication, policy is geared to further excluding rather than
including the poor. On subsidies, the Finance Minister declares
in his budget speech that: ''To ensure greater efficiency, cost
effectiveness and better delivery for both kerosene and fertilisers,
the Government will move towards direct transfer of cash subsidy
to people living below poverty line in a phased manner.'' While
cash transfers are poor substitutes for subsidies and are therefore
controversial (as discussed in an accompanying article), the statement
also does not make clear what this ''targeted transfer'' would
do to the volume of subsidies. An examination of the figures,
however, makes that clear. It shows that aggregate subsidies which
rose from Rs.141351 crore in 2009-10 to an estimated Rs.164,153
crore in 2010-11, are expected to decline to Rs.143,570 crore
in 2011-12. This decline is before we take account of the erosion
of the ''real'' value of these subsidies on account of inflation.
There are two ways in which Mr. Mukherjee is expecting to ensure
the slash in subsidies. The first is by reducing fertiliser subsidies
by around Rs.5,000 crore and petroleum subsidies by a huge amount
of nearly Rs.15,000 crore. Both these are possibly going to be
realised through a shift to a cash transfer system. That would
happen in a year when oil prices are expected to rule extremely
high, and when the government has signalled that it is not willing
to reduce duties on petroleum products to neutralise even a part
of the price increase. Even if domestic prices are adjusted to
take account of increases in international prices, the government
could have reduced the proportional or ad valorem duties it levies
on these products to reduce the burden imposed on consumers. Thus,
for much of the population higher prices of fertiliser and petroleum
products and their knock on effects on inflation seem inevitable.
The second way in which subsidies are to be reduced is by capping
the food subsidy in nominal, money terms in a year when the Food
Security Act is supposed to be enacted and implemented. The total
subsidy on food is budgeted to remain in 2011-12 at the previous
year’s level of around Rs. 60,500. This despite the fact that
food price inflation is high and the UPA’s promise was to extend
and expand access to the public distribution system. It must be
noted that this cut in subsidies is likely to aggravate ongoing
inflationary trends. And the Finance Minister’s decision to make
up for the revenue loss due to his direct tax concessions with
increases in indirect taxes would in a number of cases contribute
further to inflation. The budget appears to be contributing to,
rather than combating, inflation.
The Finance Minister claims that he is addressing the inflation
problem through supply side adjustments aimed at increasing the
production of food articles and streamlining the supply chain
with a set of small expenditures and some gratuitous advice to
the states. But, while this claim is made, allocations show that
there is to be no effort whatsoever to step up plan spending on
the agricultural sector, and reverse the long-term decline in
public capital formation in agriculture related areas.
Central Plan outlays on Agriculture and Allied Activities, which
increased from Rs.11014.14 crore in 2009-10 to Rs.14361.55 crore
in 2010-11, are budgeted to rise only marginally in nominal terms
to Rs.14744.15 core in 2011-12, which amounts to a significant
decline in real, inflation-adjusted terms. The corresponding figures
for Rural Development are Rs.38569.04 crore, Rs.46104.1 crore
and Rs.46292.08 crore, which too point in the same direction.
Unwilling to spend money on building rural infrastructure and
enhancing productivity to restore the viability of crop production,
the Finance Minister seems to be hoping that the rural population
will be able to borrow their way out of an agrarian crisis. Towards
that end he has called for an increase in credit flow to the rural
areas from Rs.375000 crore to Rs.475000 crore. Credit is indeed
important, but private debt is no substitute for public investment.
In fact, there is much evidence to show that public investment
is needed to stimulate private productive investment in agriculture.
Thus, the budget does little to address the long-term supply constraints
that underlie the inflationary surge.
Mr. Mukherjee of course claims that he is adopting more immediate
measures to protect the really poor from the worst effects of
inflation. An example he gives is the decision to link wages paid
under NREGA to inflation. But those wages have been fixed in nominal
terms at Rs.100 a day, which is less than the legal minimum wage,
and can hardy be considered adequate protection against hunger
and malnutrition.
The refusal to consider the legally declared minimum wage as an
inviolable benchmark is visible elsewhere as well. When the Minister
declared that he is doubling the wages paid to Anganwadi workers
to Rs.3,000 a month, all he was doing was bringing that wage in
line with what is paid under NREGA, which, as noted, is short
of the minimum wage. But even faulty and inadequate measures of
this kind are presented as major advances towards ''inclusion''
of the poor. The mismatch between claims and policies in this
area is reflected in the allocations to the social sectors. Though
the central plan outlay on social services such as education and
health, are budgeted to rise from Rs.136,941 crore in 2010-11
to a higher Rs.153,182 crore in 2011-12, that increase is almost
matched by a budgeted decline in non-plan expenditures on this
sector from Rs.35,085 crore to Rs.20,862 crore.
In sum, this budget is afflicted to a far greater degree than
before by a kind of cynicism that leads to policy paralysis. No
more is the budget seen as an instrument through which resources
are mobilised not just to keep growth going but to distribute
its benefits to those left behind or marginalised by the growth
process. The cynicism runs so deep that those responsible for
policy are not willing to heed calls even from within their own
party to garner resources for enhanced social expenditures and
social protection. The treatment being afforded to the Sonia Gandhi
headed National Advisory Council is evidence enough of this. This
kind of cynicism and brazenness is disconcerting because among
the economic benefits expected from functioning within the framework
of parliamentary democracy is a check on the executive arm of
government in the form of a ''fear'' of inflation, a distaste
for excessive inequality and a sensitivity to deprivation. This
seems lacking today.
There are two factors that could account for this. One is the
possibility that what we are witnessing is a form of ''state capture''
in which those holding the policy reins do not believe they need
to do things that give them legitimacy and help them win voter
support. That is seen as the task of those managing parties and
not governments.
The other is that the powerful within the executive arm believe
that fiscal policy is no more an important instrument of development
policy. This seems to be part of the belief that private initiative
and markets, facilitated by government largesse of course, will
deliver ''growth'', the benefits of which will ''in time'' reach
the people. There is evidence of such belief in this budget too,
which has much on offer for private domestic and foreign capital.
For example, bond and mutual fund markets have been opened up
further to foreign investors who have been provided a substantial
concession in the form of a reduced withholding tax. Privatisation
of the public sector is to be accelerated. Entry for corporates
into banking is to permitted. And, the revenue foregone on account
of exemptions and tax concessions for corporate tax payers alone
is not just high, but is projected to increase from Rs.72,881
crore in 2010-11 to Rs.88,263 crore in 2011-12. That sum far exceeds
the subsidy on food, for example, that is to be curtailed.
This kind of exclusionary policy is sought to be justified by
focusing on the growth achievements of the country, led by the
private sector. The obsession with growth does have some fall
out for capital spending in certain areas. Central Plan outlay
for the Energy sector, that rose only from Rs.114307.9 crore in
2009-10 to Rs.126225.24 crore in 2010-11 is projected to rise
to Rs.155495.16 crore in 2011-12. The corresponding figures for
Industry and Minerals are Rs.30690.33 crore, Rs.38851.66 crore
and Rs. 45213.76 crore respectively and for Transport Rs.86453.03
crore, Rs.98726.87 crore and Rs.116860.91 crore. The UPA government
is conscious that its growth obsession requires that the infrastructure
needed for the private sector to flourish has to be invested in.
But given the absence of any semblance of economic governance
and the evidence of fiscal conservatism associated with neoliberal
ideology, even these objectives may not be realised.