For
the greater part of the past three decades, West Bengal has been among
the middle ranking states of India, both in terms of per capita income
and human development indicators. This has been despite the special feature
of the state, that it has been ruled continuously by a Left Front government
that has provided political stability and also, particularly in the first
two decades, a clear orientation towards improving the conditions of workers
and peasants.
This has made West Bengal the most active state in respect of land reform
in the past two decades, leading the rest of the country not only in recording
and legal recognition of the rights of sharecroppers but also in enforcing
land ceilings and distributing surplus and vested land. (It should be
remembered that even now West Bengal distributes more land to landless
peasants than it acquires, and certainly distributes more than any other
state.) It also made the state a pioneer in the decentralisation of powers
to the panchayats, well before the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution
encouraged greater devolution in other states as well.
While these measures certainly contributed to the breaking of the “agrarian
impasse” in Bengal and allowed for more rapid and diversified agricultural
performance in the state, in other respects the economic performance of
the state has been below expectation. This reflects the inherent difficulty
of an autonomous development trajectory within a single state, even with
a federal system of government, and the role of broader macroeconomic
processes in determining outcomes even within the state.
To this must be added several other constraints on growth, which are essentially
the effects of history and geography. At Independence, West Bengal was
among the more industrialised states of the country. Subsequently, however,
a combination of factors meant that organised manufacturing industry generally
stagnated, especially compared to other regions. These included the absence
of a local bourgeoisie with an inherent interest in investing within the
state; reduction in public investment in railways that had previously
encouraged the local engineering industries; and national policies such
as the freight equalisation policy that eliminated the state’s regional
cost advantages from proximity to coal and steel resources.
In addition, West Bengal has been situated in what has been a relatively
poor and economically stagnant region of India, such that there have been
very few economic growth stimuli coming from the surrounding region. Indeed,
for the better part of the past two decades the economy of West Bengal
has been the only dynamic one in the region.
Despite these constraints, it is not generally known that over the 1990s
West Bengal was one of the fastest growing states in India, and actually
showed the second highest rate of aggregate SDP growth among major states,
after Karnataka. This tendency was even more marked in per capita terms,
because West Bengal has been successful in controlling fertility to a
greater extent than many other states.
While agricultural output growth was the dominant reason for this, industrial
output also grew rapidly, not so much in the organised sector but in the
non-registered and unorganised manufacturing industries that proliferated
as a consequence of greater rural prosperity. For the past decade, West
Bengal has had the largest number of and the most rapid growth in small-scale
and cottage industries among all the states of India.
However, much like small manufacturing elsewhere in the country, such
small units in West Bengal have recently been adversely affected by neo-liberal
economic policies implemented by the central government, which have led
to rising costs and greater competition from both organised manufacturing
and liberalised imports. The negative fallout of these processes on small
manufacturers and traders has been particularly evident since the start
of the current decade.
These tendencies in turn form the backdrop to the new industrialisation
strategy of the Government of West Bengal especially since 2004, which
has sought to engage, attract and provide incentives for large corporate
capital in order to increase the rate of industrial investment. This article
considers the available evidence on growth trends in the state since 1999-2000.
Chart
1 indicates that after 1999-2000, West Bengal was growing slightly faster
than India as a whole in per capita terms until 2004-05, after which its
expansion has been slightly less rapid but still creditable. The per capita
income of West Bengal is now slightly lower than the national average.
Charts 2a and 2b show that growth up to 2004-05 was accompanied
by even more rapid changes in the sectoral composition of output than
have occurred in the rest of India. As for India as a whole, the share
of the secondary sector has remained almost constant, increasing only
very slightly. But the share of the primary sector (which in West Bengal
is dominantly agriculture) has shrunk by as much as 7 percentage points
in just five years, with the gap being taken up by services expansion.
Within
services, only a few sub-sectors account for this growing share. The transport
and communications sectors, trade, hotels and restauranats and public
administration and community services have actually fallen in terms of
share of State Domestic Product in these five years. However, banking
and other financial services and real estate and business services have
increased their respective shares sharply.
The critical issue from the point of view of well-being of the
people, of course, is how far the changes in sectoral composition of output
have involved changes in employment patterns as well. Therefore, Table
1 presents some calculations of the relative shares in output and employment
by major sectors in 1999-2000 and 2004-05, using NSS estimates based on
the two recent large-sample Employment and Unemployment Surveys.
Table
1:
Recent structural changes in output and employment in West Bengal |
|
1999-2000 |
2004-05 |
|
Share
of
SDP |
|
Share of
SDP |
Share
of
work force |
Primary sector |
34.45 |
47.76 |
26.42 |
46.35 |
Manufacturing |
12.46 |
20.04 |
10.86 |
17.45 |
Electricity, gas & water supply |
1.11 |
0.35 |
1.26 |
0.24 |
Construction |
4.32 |
3.31 |
7.04 |
4.54 |
Trade, hotels & restaurants |
11.49 |
10.35 |
13.5 |
13.36 |
Transport, storage & communications |
5.37 |
4.27 |
5.75 |
5.57 |
Financial, real estate & business services |
16.82 |
1.32 |
22.86 |
2.11 |
Public admin and other services |
13.98 |
12.6 |
12.31 |
10.38 |
Sources:
1. BAES, Government of West Bengal for SDP.
2. NSSO Employment and Unemployment 55th and 61st Rounds
for work force data, referring to Usual
Status Workers (Principal plus Subsidiary).
The
evidence presented in Table 1 is disconcerting. While the share of the
primary sector in outout has fallen sharply, as noted above, its share
in employment has barely changed at all, and it continues to account for
around 46-47 per cent of the work force. This is also true of India as
a whole, of course, although the absolute share of the primary sector
in employment is lower in West Bengal (at less than half of all workers),
and the decline in share has also been smaller than in the average for
India.
But
the manufacturing sector has also declined in relative importance, to
some extent in terms of the share of output and even more in terms of
the proportion of workers engaged in such activity. Meanwhile, the services
sectors that have accounted for the biggest increases in share of output
have increased their share of employment to a much lesser extent. In particular,
financial, real estate and business services accounted for 23 per cent
of the State Domestic Product in 2004-05, but only 2 per cent of the work
force! So both in the manufacturing sector and in the more dynamic services
sectors, growth of output has involved very little expansion in employment.
This is of course in a nutshell the central problem of development today,
not only in West Bengal but in all of India. Clearly it cannot be solved
by a concentration only on corporate-driven growth in industry or services,
as such investment is typically more capital-intensive and generates less
employment per unit of output than investment by smaller producers. So
the state government obviously has to develop a multi-pronged strategy
for employment generation that encompasses several different approaches.
There is a further issue on the nature of recent growth in West Bengal,
which is in terms of its regional spread – or rather, the lack of it.
Post-1999 income growth has been overwhelmingly concentrated in the metropolitan
area of Kolkata and the surrounding hinterland, thereby widening income
gaps between Kolkata and the rest of the state that were already very
large.
Chart 3 show the disparity between per capita income in Kolkata and in
all other districts in 2004-05. No other district had a per capita income
that was even half of that of Kolkata, not even those that are contiguous
or nearby the capital. More than half the districts had per capita incomes
of around one-third that of Kolkata, or even less. While it does not appear
on the chart, it should also be noted that for almost every district,
the per capita income gap with respect to Kolkata has actually widened
since 1999-2000, indicating that the recent pattern of economic growth
has accentuated spatial inequalities within the state.
Finally, of
course, it is well known that growth in aggregate income need not always
translate into improvements in material consumption of the people in general.
This is evident from a comparison of the per capita income of the districts
with estimates of mean per capita consumption obtained from the NSS 61st
Round consumer expenditure survey. Table 2 presents this information.
The district-level data on per capita consumption is derived by using
Small Area Estimation techniques to arrive at estimates with the least
variation for each district. They do have a number of limitations, since
the sample sizes are generally not large enough to permit generalisation.
Nevertheless, the data presented in the table reveal several interesting
facts. Firstly, and expectedly, there is substantial variation between
the per capita income and mean consumption in general and across districts.
Second, in several cases the variation is so large as to change the rank
of the district quite significantly, as for example for North 24 Parganas
(where the rank improves hugely for per capita consumption) and Jalpaiguri
(where the rank falls sharply for per capita consumption).
Table
2:
Per capita income and estimated
per capita consumption in the districts of West Bengal, 2004-05 |
|
Per capita DDP in
2004-05 |
Rank in
per capita income |
Per capita consumption |
Rank in
per capita consumption |
Darjeeling |
25894.04 |
2 |
7085.16 |
10 |
Jalpaiguri |
21389.56 |
7 |
5801.76 |
14 |
Koch
Bihar |
18138.93 |
14 |
6844.68 |
11 |
Uttar
Dinajpur |
13817.83 |
18 |
7128.60 |
8 |
Dakshin
Dinajpur |
18461.43 |
12 |
5554.20 |
16 |
Malda |
19763.99 |
10 |
5641.68 |
15 |
Murshidabad |
18162.13 |
13 |
5910.48 |
13 |
Birbhum |
17174.06 |
16 |
5516.28 |
17 |
Bardhaman |
25397.78 |
3 |
8165.64 |
5 |
Nadia |
20662.33 |
8 |
7119.12 |
9 |
North
24 Parganas |
18070.18 |
15 |
10939.56 |
2 |
Hugli |
24012.91 |
5 |
9347.64 |
3 |
Bankura |
19994.67 |
9 |
6645.24 |
12 |
Purulia |
16901.32 |
17 |
4800.00 |
18 |
Medinipur |
22458.08 |
6 |
7733.76 |
7 |
Haora |
24406.27 |
4 |
8357.64 |
4 |
Kolkata |
53015.06 |
1 |
17122.08 |
1 |
South
24 Parganas |
18547.34 |
11 |
7901.64 |
6 |
While the disparities between Kolkata and the rest of the state in terms
of per capita consumption were also large, they were slightly less than
has been observed for per capita income. Overall, this table suggests
the need for caution in interpreting per capita District Domestic Product
as an accurate indicator of either consumption or overall well-being of
the local people.
It is evident that the estimated per capita consumption in the different
districts was somewhere around one half and one-third of the per capita
output. Assuming that workers and small peasants consume all or most of
their income (and may even dissave through debt) this suggests a very
large share of surplus in the form of profits, rents, etc.
This knowledge allows for a further refinement of the basic development
question mentioned earlier: how can existing surpluses be tapped and mobilised
to ensure both expansion of productive capacity in a way that creates
gainful employment opportunities and better material and human development
conditions for the people? It is this very difficult question that must
be answered if the development strategy of West Bengal government is to
be successful in creating unambiguous and widely welcomed gains for the
citiziens of the state. |