The
evidence is stark and incontrovertible. In the period since April 2003,
India has witnessed an extraordinary surge in foreign institutional investments.
Having averaged $1776 million a year during 1993-94 to 1997-98, net FII
investment dipped to an average of $295 million during 1997-99, influenced
no doubt by the Southeast Asian crisis. The average rose again to $1829
million during 1999-2000 to 2001-02 only to fall $377 million in 2002-03.
The surge began immediately thereafter and has yet to come to an end.
Inflows averaged $9599 million a year during 2003-05 and are estimated
at $9429 million during the first nine months of 2005-06. Going by data
from the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), while cumulative
net FII flows into India since the liberalisation of rules governing such
flows in the early 1990s till end-March 2003 amounted to $15,804 million,
the increment in cumulative value between that date and the end of December
2005 was $25,267 million.
It is not surprising that the period of surge in FII investments was also
one when, despite fluctuations, the stock market has been extremely buoyant.
The market in India lacks width and depth, with few investors, few companies
whose shares are actively traded, and a small proportion of those shares
available for trading. Hence any new capital inflow does trigger price
increases. The Bombay Sensex rose from 3727 on March 3, 2003 to 5054 on
July 22, 2004, and then on to 6017 on November 17, 2004, 7077 on June
21, 2005, 8073 on November 2, 2005 and 9323 on December 30, 2005. The
implied price increases of more than 80 per cent over a 17-month period
and 50 per cent over just more than a year are indeed remarkable. Market
observers, the financial media and a range of analysts have concurred
that FII investments have been an important force, even if not always
the only one, driving markets to their unprecedented highs.
Underlying the current FII and stock market surge is, of course, a continuous
process of liberalisation of the rules governing such investment: its
sources, its ambit, the caps it was subject to and the tax laws pertaining
to it. It could, however, be argued that the liberalisation began in the
early 1990s, but this surge is a new phenomenon which must be related
to the returns now available to investors that make it worth their while
to exploit the opportunity offered by liberalisation. The point, however,
is that while the good profit performance of domestic firms may partly
explain the high returns of recent times, there were other factors that
may have been more crucial. To start with, current account surpluses,
higher remittances and rising inflows on account of exports of software
services had ensured a strengthening of the Indian rupee, despite the
RBI's effort to manage the exchange rate with large purchases of foreign
currency. A stronger rupee implies better returns in dollar terms, encouraging
foreign investors looking for capital gains. This possibly even triggered
a speculative surge in inflows because of expectations that the rupee
would rise even further. Given the role of FII investments in increasing
the supply of foreign exchange, such expectations tend to be self-fulfilling
at least for a period of time.
Returns on stockmarket investment were also hiked through state policy.
Just before the FII surge began, and influenced perhaps by the sharp fall
in net FII investments in 2002-03, the then Finance Minister declared
in the Budget for 2003-04: ''In order to give a further fillip to the
capital markets, it is now proposed to exempt all listed equities that
are acquired on or after March 1, 2003, and sold after the lapse of a
year, or more, from the incidence of capital gains tax. Long term capital
gains tax will, therefore, not hereafter apply to such transactions. This
proposal should facilitate investment in equities.'' Long term capital
gains tax was being levied at the rate of 10 per cent up to that point
of time. The surge was no doubt facilitated by this significant concession.
Once the FII increase resulting from these factors triggered a boom in
stock prices, expectations of further price increases took over, and the
incentive to benefit from untaxed capital gains was only strengthened.
In the circumstances, there is reason to believe that the herd instinct
so typical of financial investors played a role in sustaining the boom,
with a rush of investors into the country. The number of FIIs registered
in India stood at 502 at the end of March 2003, many of whom had registered
immediately after the rules were liberalised to permit their entry. As
many as 353 FIIs had registered by the end of March 1996. The second spike
in FII registration is more recent. Thus, the number of FIIs registered
in the country rose by 321 between end 2002-03 and end of December 2005,
when the figure touched 823.
Even a cursory assessment of recent developments would, therefore, lead
to three tentative conclusions. First, that FII investment does seem volatile
even when annual average figures are considered. Second, while an initial
promise of high returns triggered FII interest, speculative objectives
and the herd instinct have played a role in keeping investment high and
the markets buoyant. And, third, given the massive and concentrated inflows
in recent times there are reasons to be concerned with their macroeconomic
implications and the danger of an equally sudden reversal.
There have been too many instances in East Asia, Latin America, Turkey
and elsewhere where a financial crisis was preceded by a surge in capital
flows other than foreign direct investment and a simultaneous boom in
stock and/or real estate markets. Independent of their inclinations, the
exact causal mechanisms they identify and where they place the burden
of blame, analysts of those periodic crises have accepted the reality
that liberalised financial markets are prone to boom-bust cycles. Hence,
even if the ongoing India-boom is seen by some as being ''different''
and ''warranted by fundamentals'', there remains ample room for caution.
Most booms were seen as signs of strength rather than vulnerability, till
they went bust.
The case for vulnerability to speculative attacks is strengthened because
of the growing presence in India of institutions like Hedge Funds, which
are not regulated in their home countries and resort to speculation in
search of quick and large returns. These hedge funds, among other investors,
exploit the route offered by sub-accounts and opaque instruments like
participatory notes to invest in the Indian market. Since FIIs permitted
to register in India include asset management companies and incorporated/institutional
portfolio managers, the 1992 guidelines allowed them to invest on behalf
of clients who themselves are not registered in the country. These clients
are the ‘sub-accounts' of registered FIIs. Participatory notes are instruments
sold by FIIs registered in the country to clients abroad that are derivatives
linked to an underlying security traded in the domestic market. These
derivatives not only allow the foreign clients of the FIIs to earn incomes
from trading in the domestic market, but to trade these notes themselves
in international markets. By the end of August 1995, the value of equity
and debt instruments underlying participatory notes that had been issued
by FIIs amounted to Rs. 78,390 crore or 47 per cent of cumulative net
FII investment. Through these routes, entities not expected to play a
role in the Indian market can have a significant influence on market movements.
In October 2003, The Economist reported that: ''Although a few hedge funds
had invested in India soon after the country began liberalising its financial
markets in the early 1990s, their interest has surged recently. Industry
sources estimate that perhaps 25-30 per cent of all foreign equity investments
are now held by hedge funds.''
The problem does not end here. For some time now, the capital surge has
been eroding the ability of the central bank to pursue its monetary policy
objectives. The foreign exchange assets of the central bank rose sharply,
from $42.3 billion at the end of March 2001 to 54.1 billion at the end
of March 2002, $76.1 billion at the end of March 2003, $113 billion at
the end of March 2004 and $142 billion at the end of March 2005. The process
of reserve accumulation is the result of the pressure on the central bank
to purchase foreign currency in order to shore up demand and dampen the
effects on the rupee of excess supplies of foreign currency. In India's
liberalized foreign exchange markets, excess supply leads to an appreciation
of the rupee, which in turn undermines the competitiveness of India's
exports. Since improved export competitiveness and an increase in exports
is a leading objective of economic liberalisation, the persistence of
a tendency towards rupee appreciation would imply that the reform process
is internally contradictory. Not surprisingly the RBI and the government
have been keen to dampen, if not stall, appreciation.
Unfortunately, the RBI's ability to persist with this policy without eroding
its ability to control domestic money supply is increasingly under threat.
Increases in the foreign exchange assets of the central bank amount to
an increase in reserve money and therefore in money supply, unless the
RBI manages to neutralise increased reserve holding by retrenching other
assets. If that does not happen the overhang of liquidity in the system
increases substantially, affecting the RBI's ability to pursue its monetary
policy objectives. Till recently the RBI has been avoiding this problem
through its sterilisation policy, which involves the sale of its holdings
of central government securities to match increases in its foreign exchange
assets. But even this option has now more or less run out. Net Reserve
Bank Credit to the government, reflecting the RBI's holding of government
securities, had fallen from Rs. 1,67,308 crore at the end of May 2001
to Rs. 4,626 crore by December 10, 2004. There was little by way of sterilisation
instruments available with the RBI.
There are two consequences of these developments. First, the monetary
policy of the central bank that had been delinked from the fiscal policy
initiatives of the state by foreclosing monetisation of government debt
is no more independent. More or less autonomous capital flows influence
the reserves position of the central bank and therefore the level of money
supply, unless the central bank chooses to leave the exchange rate unmanaged,
which it cannot. This implies that the central bank is not in a position
to use monetary levers to influence domestic economic variables. Secondly,
the country is subject to a drain of foreign exchange inasmuch as there
is substantial difference between the repatriable returns earned by foreign
investors and the foreign exchange returns earned by the Reserve Bank
of India on the investments of its reserves in relatively liquid assets.
While partial solutions to this problem can be sought in mechanisms like
the Market Stabilisation Scheme (which places government securities in
a market stabilisation facility that increases the interest costs borne
by the government), it is now increasingly clear that the real option
in the current situation is to either curb inflows of foreign capital
or encourage outflows of foreign exchange.
Informed
by the global experience the RBI has been making a case for caution. It
has pointed to the problems created by volatile capital inflows for exchange
rate and monetary management. It has flagged the dangers associated with
investments through the sub-account or participatory note (PN) routes,
which can be exploited by unregulated and/or unidentified entities involved
in take-over bids, money laundering or short-term speculation. And it
called for policies that can reduce the vulnerability associated with
volatility.
It must be said to the credit of the UPA that currently rules the country
that it had sensed these tendencies quite early, so that its National
Common Minimum Programme declared that ''FIIs will continue to be encouraged
while the vulnerability of the financial system to the flow of speculative
capital will be reduced.'' In keeping with that perception, the Prime
Minister constituted an Expert Group to provide an action plan to meet
that commitment. The committee's constitution was officially notified
on November 2, 2004 and it was to submit its report by November 30, 2004.
The Group actually submitted its report a year later in November 2005.
If the gravity of its content is the yardstick to go by, there would be
no reason to take note of this report. Filled with assertions, it reads
more like a pamphlet advocating financial liberalisation than the report
of a group of experts. And where there are indications of expertise, these
amount to no more than an excessively selective review of related literature,
which is often not even woven into the flow of the report's argument.
There have been many other reports dealing with similar issues emanating
from agencies like the Reserve Bank of India in which policy-makers may
fruitfully invest their reading time. However, because this report emanates
from the Finance Ministry and includes a note of dissent from the representative
of the RBI, which substantially distances the central bank from the contents
of the report, it partly reflects both the trend of thought and the tensions
which prevail in the corridors of decision-making. It is the source not
the content that warrants giving it attention.
From the discussion of recent trends with regard to FII movements it should
be clear that by the time the Group was constituted and definitely by
the time the Group submitted its report, the issue of encouraging FIIs
was of little significance, with the problem being one of managing the
surge in such flows. Yet the thrust of the whole report is on encouraging
FII flows and not dealing with vulnerability. The emphasis seems to be
on ensuring that no corrective policies are adopted and that the process
of liberalisation is continued with. To quote the report: ''While there
is indeed the issue of timing the policy of encouragement appropriately,
to avoid the pitfalls of throwing the baby with the bath water, there
can not be a turnaround from the avowed policy of gradual liberalisation.
Any recommendation made today should be consistent with the broad strategy
of further liberalisation, and not look like or be a rollback of reforms.''
On what grounds then does the expert group justify its case for further
encouragement rather than increased regulation? To start with, there are
arguments extolling the virtues of foreign institutional investment, each
of which needs examination. Prime among these is the view that FII investments
help increase stock prices and therefore reduce the cost of equity capital.
It is unclear exactly how this occurs. FII investments in themselves do
not increase earnings. So if FII investments that raise prices are warranted
by fundamentals, earnings should be high and price-earnings ratios should
be low. If these earnings are not being paid out as dividends then the
expectation should be that earnings would rise from their current levels,
so that capital gains can be booked. This makes the investment inherently
speculative.
In any case, the price increase occurs mainly in the secondary market,
and does not directly contribute to additional equity for investment unless
new shares are issued at higher prices. This has indeed been true of some
large firms which have been able to mobilise large sums through the premium
at which they are able to issue additional equity. But, unlike the case
during the scam-induced stock market boom of the early 1990s, the recent
boom or any of the mini-booms that occurred in between did not see successful
IPO issues by smaller or new firms. In essence, therefore, the effect
of the stock price boom is to transfer surpluses from investors to large
corporates through the so called cheap-equity route. To the extent that
the investors are small savers, this amounts to a form of forced saving,
leveraged through speculation.
The second argument advanced in favour of FII investment is that, like
FDI, it is a safe and sustainable mechanism of funding the current account
deficit. Elsewhere the report suggests that because of ''infirmities of
Indian indirect taxes and transportation infrastructure'', FDI flows to
India have remained small relative to China. While sweeping generalisations
of this kind need not detain us here, it must be noted that the FII surge
to India occurred precisely at a time when India did not need these flows
to finance her balance of payments. In the event, as noted above much
of this foreign exchange was added to India's reserves.
Finally, FII investments are supported on the grounds that FII participation
in domestic capital markets often leads to sound corporate governance
practices, improved efficiency and better shareholder value. One only
needs to refer to the innumerable instances of fraudulent accounting practices,
conflict of interest and manipulation involving FII principals periodically
reported from their home country markets, to make light of this claim.
While the authors of the report stretch themselves in this fashion to
advocate the cause of the FIIs, they virtually dismiss all arguments that
point to the dangers involved in the growing presence of FIIs in Indian
markets. Herding is not a problem because, FIIs are ostensibly observed
to be involved in buying and selling at the same time. Vulnerability is
not an issue ostensibly because there has never been an occasion when
more than a billion dollars flowed out in one month. The fact that there
has not been any previous period except the last three years when FII
investments anywhere near an annual $9-10 billion Indian has entered Indian
markets is conveniently ignored. Similarly, the problem of opaqueness
of sub-accounts and PNs is set aside by suggesting that FIIs should be
''obliged'' to report on the identity of their investment sources. And
since all modern market economies have ostensibly evolved policies to
reconcile prudent monetary management with the benefits of a liberal capital
account, there is seen to be no scope for diffidence in India.
Having set the stage with these assertions, the report goes on to advocate
measures that would further encourage FII investments. Thus, it recommends
that FII investment and FDI must be treated separately, and the cap on
FII investment ''if any'' reckoned over and above prescribed FDI caps.
The danger that takeover efforts may be strengthened through opaque means
such as sub-accounts and PNs must be dealt with by requiring the reporting
of clients holding such positions. However, the current dispensation with
regard to participatory notes should continue. Any policy with regard
to the operation of Hedge Funds should be postponed till such time as
regulatory mechanisms are introduced in the US and elsewhere and these
are studied. FIIs should be given operational flexibility by allowing
them the freedom to switch between equity and debt investments, so that
they can pursue more ''balanced'' strategies. Finally, since with the
growing presence of FIIs in the market there is a shortage of good quality
equity, disinvestment of profitable public sector equity, as in the case
of Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL), Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
(ONGC) and National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), must be resorted
to! At least to the knowledge of this author this is the first time such
a bizarre argument in favour of disinvestment of public sector units (PSUs)
has been advanced.
All these are clearly aimed at encouraging more FII investment flow. But
what does the report say about vulnerability? To the extent that it matters,
here too more liberalisation is the answer. In the view of the experts:
''The participation of domestic pension funds in the equity market would
augment the diversity of views on the market. This would also end the
anomaly of the existing situation where foreign pension funds are extensive
users of the Indian equity market but domestic pension funds are not.''
That will socialise the cost of dealing with unrecognised vulnerability,
by making a section of the middle class bear a part of the burden of seeking
to promote the ''irrational exuberance'' that seems to characterise the
market.
Fortunately, the RBI has not been taken in by this euphoria. In its own
sober fashion it makes the following points: (i) that the Expert Group's
report does not address the macroeconomic implications of volatility of
capital flows and the fall-out of excessive inflows and outflows for macroeconomic
management and suggest appropriate measures to deal with the problem;
(ii) that a special group should be constituted on a priority basis to
address these issues comprehensively; (iii) that in view of the growing
international concern regarding the origin and source of investment funds
flowing into the country, the issue of participatory notes should not
be permitted (since trading of these PNs will lead to multi-layering)
and hedge funds, which by their very nature cannot be subject to regulation,
registered with SEBI should be examined for deregistration; (iv) that
the government should continue with its policy of keeping separate FII
and FDI limits; (v) that the requirement of special resolutions to be
passed by both the shareholders (in an EGM) and the board of a company
for enhancing the FII limit beyond 24 per cent, wherever applicable under
the present policy guidelines should continue, and in cases like retail
trading, where FDI is not allowed and the limit for FII investments is
24 percent, that limit should not be increased; and (vi) that it would
not be appropriate to permit FII to treat debt securities (both government
and corporate debt) as an investment avenue and a ceiling on the total
stock of FII investment in debt should be retained.
In sum, the RBI, conscious of the problems created by volatility and the
surge in FII inflows, has virtually disowned much of the report, which
now reflects a Finance Ministry view. The fact that the so-called Expert
Group was loaded with members from the Finance Ministry seems to explain
its failure to accommodate the legitimate concerns of the central bank
which is charged with managing the balance of payments and the exchange
rate. And the desire of the Finance Ministry to continue to impose it
views is reflected in the recommendation that the Department of Economic
Affairs should initiate a research program on ''Capital flows and India's
Financial Sector: Learning from theory, international experience, and
Indian evidence''. Given the circumstances, this seems to be nothing more
than the launch of another effort to offer an apology for international
speculators operating in India's stock and debt markets, ignoring the
views of the central bank.
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