1. If poverty reduction is an explicit over-riding
concern, any programme, project or policy must be evaluated for its
effects on this, which means assessment of its impact on poorer
populations in terms of :
-
productive employment opportunities
-
access to and price of basic food requirements
-
access to basic housing/shelter requirements
-
access to and price of basic infrastructure services,
including power, water, sanitation
-
access to and price of health services
-
access to and price of education services
-
access to and voice in the institutions of governance
and administration
Focussing on all these
indicators in turn implies that poverty is viewed as a multi-dimensional
phenomenon, rather than simply in terms of nutritional deprivation, and
the effects of material poverty on social exclusion are also recognised.
2. Privatisation of public sector enterprises is not and should never be
an end in itself; rather it can be viewed as a means to particular ends.
Some of the most common aims of privatisation programmes include the
following :
-
in the
case of loss-making enterprises, reducing the fiscal drain on the
state, so as to release resources for more important expenditures in
physical and social infrastructure, which would directly impact on
poverty
-
in the
case of profit-making enterprises, providing immediate relief to the
fiscal situation by using the sale proceeds to retire some public debt
and thereby reduce the interest burden of the government
-
reducing monopoly behaviour of large state enterprises
-
improving management and introducing sound business principles into
the organisation of economic activities, on the grounds that private
owners impart more "efficiency" into the system
-
providing positive signals to private investors for fresh investment
into the economy.
Obviously, only the
first (and to some extent the second) has a direct bearing in terms of a
potential positive impact on poverty reduction. But the extent to which
resources released by privatisation are actually employed in more
socially necessary investment varies, and the fungibility of fiscal
resources means that this can never really be clearly predetermined.
However, it is also often argued that the other aims listed above can
have indirect impact on poverty by improving the conditions for better
growth performance, which may in turn help to alleviate poverty. This
issue remains undecided for several reasons.
-
It is
not clearly established either theoretically or empirically that
privatisation inevitably helps to improve growth performance, which
depends upon a lot of other conditions being simultaneously fulfilled.
Indeed, it is possible for high growth to occur with state ownership
as well, depending upon other conditions.
-
Even if
growth occurs, if it is sufficiently unequal in its pattern, then it
may not lead to any improvement in the conditions of the poor. This is
clearly the case in certain types of "jobless growth" with low linkage
effects within the local economy, which have been noticed in India
recently.
-
The
greater "efficiency" of private sector functioning is not definitively
established as this depends upon the particular private agents
involved and there are many cases of inefficient private activity
also. Indeed, since the basic motivation of private functioning is
commercial profitability, it may on occasion be less efficient from a
social point of view, especially when social and private rates of
return vary and there are significant externalities.
These caveats need to be
borne in mind when considering the effects of privatisation.
3. Effects of privatisation on fiscal positions.
As mentioned above, a
dominant reason for privatisation is that of improving fiscal balances,
by reducing fiscal drain in the case of loss-making units and by
improving debt positions in the case of profit-making units. The effects
of the privatisation of loss-making units are usually typically
positive, unless the assets are sold at below their true value. This
means that the manner of the sale and the prior valuation in terms of
all possible alternative uses of the existing assets (including land)
become very important.
In the
case of profit-making units, the fiscal effect is almost invariably
negative. This is because of the simple economics of such sales.
The issue is
essentially as follows: If the government chooses to sell off an asset,
say for example to retire the public debt, it must bear in mind the
foregone income from this asset. If this asset provides an income flow
(profits etc.) that is equal to or more than the prevailing interest
rate on government securities, then the government would lose future
income by selling it.
On the other hand, from the private
buyer’s point of view, it makes no sense to purchase an asset unless it
provides at least a rate of return equal to the rate of interest on
government securities, because that is where the private investor could
otherwise put the money. This means that for such sales to occur, either
(a) the private investor must believe that it is capable of generating
more profits than the public sector - but that is essentially a
management issue and there is no logical reason why the public sector
cannot also employ managers to achieve this; or (b) the asset must be
undervalued so that the actual rate of return for the private buyer
turns out to be higher, which really means that the state exchequer has
lost the money.
4. Effects of
privatisation on productive employment opportunities.
The immediate effect of most privatisation instances is loss of
employment. This is not only because there tends to be substantial
overstaffing in public enterprises, but also because new owners
typically prefer to begin with less then ideal levels of employment to
allow for greater flexibility in both the number of workers and the
contracts under which they are employed. In addition, when the units
concerned are closed down or substantially cut in terms of operation,
there are the linkage and multiplier effects of such reduction to be
considered: employment conditions can be adversely affected in upstream
and downstream units (linked, for example, by subcontracting) as well as
in the local community through the indirect demand effects of workers’
incomes.
However, this need not necessarily imply increasing poverty. Much will
depend upon the nature of the retrenchment agreement and the benefits
offered to workers as well as the possibilities for re-employment which
depend in turn on the overall growth conditions in the economy of the
area. In addition, the sheer number of workers facing job loss is
important. If the medium term impact of some initial closure and/or
privatisation is higher growth in the economy, then obviously that could
have positive effects on employment and poverty.
5. Effects of privatisation on access to and price of basic food
requirements.
This is critically determined by the degree to which there is a
functioning Public Distribution System in the region/area, which ensures
stable and relatively cheap basic food to all. The experience with
targeting (in the form of TPDS) has not been positive, since it has
denied many people at or below the poverty line access to sufficient
food. As such, privatisation has no direct bearing on this except
insofar as it is directed towards the privatisation of such public
activities as are currently engaged in by the Food Corporation of India
and state-level departments which manage the system of Fair Price Shops.
If privatisation does involve such agencies, then the price at which
food is sold subsequently would clearly be critical. This may then imply
the need for some sort of regulation.
Similar points may be made with respect to other areas of social
expenditure such as health and education, where private ownership may
involve the effective exclusion of the poor because of inability to pay.
6. Effects of
privatisation on basic infrastructure services, including power, water,
sanitation.
This is significant because a lot of recent
privatisation is actually directed towards public utilities, which cater
to these specific needs. Here the benefits of privatisation (enumerated
above) must be counterbalanced against the potential costs, specifically
in terms of reduced access and higher prices for consumers. Recent
experience, both in India (Orissa) and elsewhere (e.g. California, South
Africa, Latin America), has indicated that in the case of natural
monopolies such as power and water distribution, the assumption of
contestable markets is not enough to prevent private companies from
indulging in monopolistic or otherwise undesirable behaviour of various
sorts. It has also been found that regulatory mechanisms may be
inadequate to prevent practices which effectively prevent the poor and
disadavantaged from access to the use of such services – such as high
prices, discontinuing services because of non-payment, etc. Since there
are large positive externalities in such service provision (and indeed
many would argue that access to water and power are among the basic
socio-economic rights of all citizens, including the poor) there is a
case for ensuring that such services remain available to all. One
alternative, with private ownership, is a combination of tighter
regulation and direct financial subsidies to private agents to ensure
that the poor continue to have access. However, this may not be
successful, and may turn out to be more expensive (in terms of public
resources) than direct public ownership. Therefore, in the case of
utilities, it is usually worth exploring various options of reform and
restructuring which improve the functioning of such companies and reduce
their losses, while retaining public ownership and/or control in order
to fulfil broader social objectives.
7. Effects of privatisation on social and political exclusion of the
poor.
The essential fact about privatisation is that, once it shifts control
to the private sector, commercial viability and profitability become the
dominant considerations. This can be of importance because it implies
that the poor, as those possessing weaker consumer power, are
effectively denied voice in determining outcomes. While standard
institutions of governance typically do face problems of inadequate
representation and voice for the poor, the fact remains that in broadly
democratic conditions (such as exist in India, at least electorally)
there is at least the potential for ensuring greater accountability from
units operating in the public sector. For this potential to be realised,
it may be necessary to devolve greater power over functioning to
decentralised elected institutions such as panchayats (which also have
the advantage of one-third statutory representation for women). But with
private ownership, ensuring voice for the various stakeholders is much
more difficult.
8. All this suggests
that the effects of privatisation on poverty reduction are crucially
dependent upon.
-
the
areas/sectors in which the privatisation is occurring – the issue
tends to be much more complicated for utilities and other economic
activities with high externalities, compared to the manufacturing
sector
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the
choice of and the nature of the new private owners and their ability
to keep the units functioning on a viable and socially desired basis,
and whether the extant regulation is adequate to ensure this
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whether
it is done for profitable or loss-making units and the associated
impact on the state exchequer in the medium term
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whether
resources released from such state involvement are actually utilised
in socially desirable activities which affect the condition of the
poor positively.
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