It is remarkable that while the threat to democracy
posed by the proposed constitutional review has been widely appreciated,
the fact that the Budget for 2000-01 announces measures which would
restrict democracy even more effectively than what the Venkatachaliah
Committee can ever plausibly do, has gone largely unnoticed. And yet
that is precisely what the effect of its financial liberalisation measures
would be.
Take for instance the proposal to give autonomy
to the Reserve Bank of India. This would mean that the entire gamut
of policies relating to monetary and exchange rate management would
be taken out of the purview of political control and handed over to
a body that would be accountable to no one, and certainly not to the
people of the country. Political control entails parliamentary control;
it therefore entails, indirectly and however imperfectly, a measure
of accountability to the people of the country. The essence of democracy
consists in enforcing this accountability to the people. Granting autonomy
to the Reserve Bank would eliminate this.
Some may ask why if the prices of vast numbers
of commodities remain outside the purview of government control (save
in exceptional cases when the government has to intervene, and that
too indirectly through supply management measures), the interest rate
and the exchange rate, which are just two prices, should be subject
to such control. The answer is simple. The interest rate and the exchange
rate are two very special prices, which have profound macroeconomic
implications, impinging on the people's living standards. The autonomy
of the Reserve Bank therefore means that decisions affecting the people's
living standards are henceforth to be entrusted to a body that, even
in principle, is not accountable to the people.
This is not just a formal point. An autonomous
body entrusted with the management of the interest and exchange rates
would naturally seek to achieve stability in both these markets by ensuring
that the "confidence of foreign investors" remains unimpaired, that
is, internationally-mobile speculative finance capital is kept appeased.
This means two things: first, it would have to have a say in all domains
that have a bearing on speculators' confidence, including fiscal policy,
trade union rights, and even the political sphere; and secondly, it
itself would have to be run by persons who inspire maximum confidence
among the international speculators, such as ex- or current World Bank
employees, ex- or current IMF employees, or those enjoying these organisations'
confidence. In short, it would be the international financiers who would
virtually run the country and not (however indirectly) the people, as
democracy entails. Measures such as granting autonomy to the Reserve
Bank therefore amount to a veritable coup d'etat carried out by international
financial interests against democratic governance. It is not surprising
that this is a demand systematically made on all countries undergoing
"structural adjustment".
Some may ask: what is wrong with this? If an
autonomous central bank, by generating "investors' confidence", can
attract larger capital flows, then so much the better. Why should we
forgo this opportunity by entrusting control over the central bank to
a bunch of dubious politicians in the name of "democracy"? After all,
countries like the U.S. have central banks that are autonomous, and
they have done well in terms of economic performance; why should not
we too follow in their footsteps? This view fails to distinguish between
speculative capital and productive capital, between "hot money flows"
and foreign direct investment. It is only the latter that can contribute
to growth, and that too if it does not supplant already existing domestic
production but adds to such production by being oriented towards the
export market which in many instances is beyond the reach of existing
domestic producers.
Speculative capital inflows do not per se contribute
to growth. On the contrary, since an economy open to such flows has
to be concerned with speculators' "confidence", which generally demands
the pursuit of deflationary policies, growth suffers as a result of
such openness. What is necessary for growth, therefore, is to encourage
the inflow of the right kind of foreign direct investment while closing
doors, or at least controlling, the inflow of the wrong kind of foreign
direct investment and, above all, of speculative capital flows. This
requires conscious political intervention; an autonomous central bank
run by a bunch of financial bureaucrats, recruited typically from the
stables of the IMF and the World Bank, would obviously never enforce
any such discriminatory controls.
The examples of the United States and the United
Kingdom are grossly misleading in this context. The Anglo-Saxon world
is the home base of international finance. In a world where finance
is left entirely free to move all over the globe, it would tend to gravitate
to the Anglo-Saxon world as a matter of course, and, from that base,
make forays elsewhere, wherever opportunities for quick gains present
themselves. The gravitation of finance into these countries creates
job opportunities in the financial sector that are massive compared
to the size of the home population (for instance, the U.K.), or generates
spending booms (for instance, the U.S.). In countries like India, by
contrast, openness to financial flows has the opposite effect of enforcing
deflation, and hence stifling growth, because finance has to be enticed
not to leave our shores. What is sauce for the U.S., therefore, is not
sauce for India.
This is precisely the argument against financial
liberalisation in India. It exposes the country to the tyranny of international
finance which is not only anti-democratic and anti-people in an obvious
sense (the latter via cuts in subsidies and social expenditures), but
is even counterproductive for growth. The Budget, however, marks a major
step towards financial liberalisation. The proposed autonomy for the
Reserve Bank is one component of it, though a striking one; but there
are others. Public sector banks are to be privatised by reducing government
equity to 33 per cent in accordance with the recommendations of the
Narasimham Committee. (The Finance Minister's claim that "this will
be done without changing the public sector character of banks" means
nothing, since private, including foreign, financiers can hold shares
through nominees; indeed the same Narasimham is on record as wanting
these banks to have one-third government, one-third foreign, and one-third
Indian private equity.)
Indian capitalists would be allowed to export
finance capital for taking over companies abroad, and hence, in general,
for speculative activities on stock markets elsewhere. Metropolitan
finance capital, in the guise of Foreign Institutional Investors, would
be allowed up to 40 per cent equity in Indian companies, enlarging the
scope not only for a "denationalisation" of Indian industry but also
for a bunch of foreign speculators to dominate the sphere of production.
Major concessions, including tax conc essions, would be offered to financial
firms specialising in providing "venture capital", that is, high-risk
and speculative investment.
These measures of financial liberalisation,
in their totality, entail three basic changes: first, the removal of
the financial system from the ambit of public accountability; second,
the elimination of the subservience, in principle, of the financial
sector to the needs of the productive economy, and the conferment upon
it of the kind of autonomy that allows speculation to take precedence
over production; and third, the removal of the insulation from the vortex
of financial flows that India's financial system has enjoyed till now.
(Though this insulation was being undermined during the liberalisation
era, the present move carries it far forward.)
These are fundamental changes. The economic
regime set up in India after Independence, which had planning, self-reliance
and sovereignty as its cornerstones, had erected a financial system
appropriate for this purpose, involving public control, public ownership
and public accountability. International finance capital has been trying
assiduously to destroy these features. The Finance Minister's announcements
show that it is succeeding. Not that this single Budget would change
the entire system at a stroke, but its direction is clear, unmistakable,
and dangerous. By pursuing the path of "financial liberalisation" which
the Budget unfolds, not only would we have "Wall Street Capitalism"
(which even economists advocating "liberalisation" deride) figuratively
imported into India, but India would get attached to Wall Street Capitalism
in actuality.
The overall thrust of this Budget is marked
by an anxiety to please metropolitan capital even as it shows remarkable
unconcern towards the interests of the nation. This is apparent from
the fact that it lowers customs duties while at the same time raising
excise duties (a sure prescription for de-industrialisation), from the
coercion exercised on all State governments to carry through power sector
reforms as desired by the World Bank, and from the virtual demolition
job it carries out on the public distribution system. Opening up the
economy to the tyranny of international finance capital betrays the
same thoughtless subservience.
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