When
the UPA government assumed office, there were two important bills
which had been passed by Parliament, which were pending notification.
These bills were very different in nature. One is inherently democratic
and progressive, the other essentially rigid and anti-democratic in
its implications. So far, only one of these has actually been notified
by the government, and the choice of the more undemocratic bill sends
out very unfortunate signals about the goals and priorities of the
new government.
The first - the Right to Information Act - is
a bill designed to strengthen and deepen the democratic process, and
is itself the outcome of a prolonged struggle by people’s movements
and civil society organisations. It would enable much greater access
to important information by the ordinary citizens about a wide range
of government activities at all levels, and would therefore not only
lead to greater accountability but also reduce possibilities of corruption
and unfair granting of favours or harassment.
However, until the last week of July this bill had not yet been notified,
which effectively means that it has not yet passed into law and therefore
cannot be implemented. The causes for delay in notifying this bill
are not evident, since there are no legal hurdles to be cleared. The
fact that the government has not done so in all these weeks, despite
continuing popular pressure and representations by prominent citizens,
suggests that freedom of information for the ordinary citizen is not
being treated as a priority.
This sluggishness is in sharp contrast to the alacrity with which
the second bill was notified by the new government. One of the first
undertakings of the UPA government - and indeed its first legislative
action - was to notify the second bill -act was notified on 2 July
to come into force on 5 July 2004, the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget
Management Act (henceforth FRBM Act). This only three days before
the presentation of the Annual Budget, thereby making circumscribing
the entire budgetary exercise from the start of the new government’s
tenure.
The FRBM Act is apparently well-intentioned, designed to clean up
public finances and put them on a sustainable footing. Thus, it requires
the reduction of the fiscal deficit and the elimination of the revenue
deficit of the Central Government by 31 March 2008 (the deadline is
to be extended by a year). This would appear to be a way of forcing
the government to adhere to a discipline which would thereby allow
it to spend more on useful capital expenditure.
However, the actual implications of the working of the Act are much
more serious and potentially adverse, than is generally understood.
The Act requires the Central Government to reduce the fiscal deficit
by 0.3 per cent of GDP each year, and the revenue deficit by 0.5 per
cent each year, beginning with this financial year. If this is not
achieved through higher tax revenues, the necessary adjustment has
to be made by cutting expenditures.
Further, the Act prohibits the Central Government from borrowing from
the Reserve Bank of India (that is deficit financing, involving the
printing of money) to meet its deficit, except for temporary cash
advances. This effectively rules out a cheap source of borrowing and
forces the government to borrow at much higher rates, for no evident
reason.
The argument that deficit financing causes inflation is not just simply
wrong. It is now widely acknowledged across the world to be ridiculous
and completely unwarranted, especially in the financially sophisticated
world we live in. So inflation control does not at all depend upon
controlling the central government’s borrowing directly from the RBI.
So this directive does not serve any useful purpose. Instead, it unnecessarily
forces the government to pay much higher interest on all its debt,
instead of allowing for some low interest debt to the RBI. This raises
the interest cost of the government and thereby the total revenue
expenditure, perversely making it harder to achieve the revenue deficit
targets. It is hard to understand why this portion of the Act has
been retained even when earlier discussion in Parliament pointed to
the absurdity of this condition,
But the most worrying - and potentially undemocratic - part of the
FRBM Act relates to compliance conditions. The Act states that ''whenever
there is a shortfall in revenue or excess of expenditure over the
pre-specified levels….the Central Government shall take appropriate
measures for increasing revenue or for reducing the expenditure (including
curtailing of the sums authorised to be paid and applied for from
and out of the Consolidated Fund of India under any Act so as to provide
for appropriation of such sums).''
The notification spells this out even more clearly: ''In case the
outcome of the quarterly review of trend in receipts and expenditure…at
the end of any financial year… shows that
- The
total non-debt receipts are less than 40 per cent pf the Budget Estimates
for that year; or
- The
fiscal deficit is higher than 45 per cent of the Budget Estimates
for that year; or
- The
revenue deficit is higher than 45 per cent of the Budget Estimates
for that year,
then…
the Central Government shall take appropriate corrective measures.''
This means that if any of these conditions holds (which is very likely
in most years) the government will in effect be forced to cut expenditures
even if they are essential for the economy, or required to enforce
its popular mandate or to deliver the socio-economic rights of the
citizens.
This is going to hit home much faster than many people realise. The
Budget 2004-05 contains what are widely recognised to be inflated
and highly optimistic revenue receipt projections. Also, the overwhelming
part of additional resource mobilisation in the budget is backloaded,
to be available only after September. In addition, the truant monsoon
is bound to depress revenues. By September, it is not just likely
but almost inevitable that the actual revenue receipts will fall short
of the Budget estimates by 40 per cent or more.
When that happens, by the Act that the government has just notified,
it will then be required to cut back on expenditure. This means that
even the low and inadequate provisions for employment, education and
other goals listed in the National Common Minimum Programme will be
further cut, and may not even increase at all.
Much of the opposition to the expenditures projected in the Budget
has focussed on the low additional outlays for critical and socially
necessary areas, which has been seen as a betrayal of the people’s
mandate. The total budgeted for these is only Rs. 10,000 crores, but
imagine the situation if even this small additional outlay is not
actually provided, because of the constraint posed by the FRBM Act!
There may be even worse to come. The fearsome combination of heavy
floods and severe drought that is affecting different parts of the
country is bound to involve lower incomes and thus lower tax collections,
as already stated. But it should also require much larger outlays
to provide even the most minimal relief to the affected people who
are spread across India. Even such critical relief and rehabilitation
- including in the form of rural employment and other physical assistance
- may be under threat from the absurdly rigid fiscal discipline imposed
by the Act.
The problems with such fiscal responsibility legislation across the
world are now becoming more and more evident. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
legislation in the US, which was the international front runner in
this regard, is now really honoured only in the breach, through shifting
many expenditures of the US federal government to off-budget heads.
In the European Union, the Growth and Stability Pact which provides
similar constraints is coming under severe pressure, and France and
Germany are already seeking ways to make it effectively meaningless
and inapplicable to actual fiscal policy.
Clearly, therefore, this is not just a foolish piece of legislation
but also fundamentally undemocratic and possibly even unconstitutional.
The new government should without delay enter into a reconsideration
of this Act, with a view to repealing it, if it is to remain responsive
and accountable to its citizenry, rather than following the dictates
of the highly dubious economic logic favoured by international investors.
There is, of course, another (more sordid) way of dealing with this
mess. Instead of recognising the wrongheaded nature of this legislation,
the government could simply choose to live with it and try to circumvent
it through ''creative accounting'' - or more crudely, fixing the books.
While this may turn out to be better for the people than actually
enforcing expenditure cuts, it is certainly undesirable because it
promotes even more lack of transparency within the government, and
less open accountability to the people. It is quite well recognised
that such off-budget padding is not only less accessible to final
recipients but also fiscally inefficient.
But come to think of it, such book-fixing and creative accounting
is feasible only if the books can be kept reasonably secret and not
open to public scrutiny. So maybe this is the real reason why the
Right to Information Act is still not being notified….
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