Themes > Current Issues
11.07.2003
Continuing Conflict in Nepal
Jayati Ghosh
Nepal is one
of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita
income of about $210 per year. It is also one of the most
politically fraught and troubled countries in the world.
Indeed, the turmoil is only increasing, as the conflict
between King Gyanendra, the parliamentary opposition
parties and the Maoist insurgency reaches new and more
complicated levels.
Nepal is a very young electoral democracy, emerging after a 'People's Movement' (in which all the main political parties were involved) agitated successfully to replace King Birendra's rule with a multi-party political system, in the early 1990s. But the experience with electoral democracy thus far has been volatile: since then Nepal has been through three general elections, eight governments and seven Prime Ministers. In addition, the Maoist insurgency that eschews parliamentary politics in favour of violent struggle, has gained substantial ground since 1996, and controls large swathes of territory across different parts of the country.
The relationship between the King and the elected politicians in Nepal has always been tense, and has deteriorated further after the reign of King Birendra. King Gyanendra (brother of Birendra) came to reign in the year 2001, after the mysterious and bloody massacre in which the then Crown Prince Dipendra was reported to have killed most of his family. Gyanendra too has indicated his lack of patience with the niceties and messiness of electoral democracy, and his preference for more 'directed' rule.
General elections were due in November 2002; instead of allowing the elections to happen, King Gyanendra exploited the infighting and chaos in the then ruling Nepali Congress by dismissing the Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba in October, and giving himself executive powers. The man installed as the puppet Prime Minister was a loyal monarchist, who was appointed without any consultation with other political parties. The King also favoured a more aggressively militaristic response to the Maoist insurgents, rather than political dialogue.
However, this situation proved to be completely unstable, and political instability as well as growing violence between the army and insurgents disrupted the life of the citizens and the peasantry in particular. The loyalist Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand, became the focus of opposition attacks, especially as the talks with the Maoists proved to be fruitless despite the ceasefire. Five political parties – the Communist Party of Nepal–Unified Marxist Leninist (UML), the Nepali Congress (NC), the Nepal Workers Party, the People's Front of Nepal and the Sadbhavana Party – all demanded that Lokendra Bahadur Chand resign and that the King reconvene parliament or hold fresh elections under an interim government of all parties.
Weeks of protest culminated in the resignation of Prime Minister Chand in May. However, once again King Gyanendra effectively spoiled the possibilities of a solution to the conflict. The King called on opposition parties to submit the name of a replacement. But when they proposed UML secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal, the King ignored them and instead appointed Thapa, leader of the rightwing royalist National Democratic Party (RPP).
Thapa appealed to the other parties to join his government but was turned down. Instead, there has been a groundswell of protests, organized by politicians of opposition parties, against the King's undemocratic tendencies, and the Maoist party has also declared its dissatisfaction. The month of June was marked by numerous demonstrations, and in July too there have been a number of incidents of protest. This government is therefore not likely to last, primarily because of the domestic chaos that it has generated. It is clear that King Gyanendra's ability to ignore popular opinion within his own country is based on the support that he receives from abroad, especially from the US and Indian governments.
The Bush administration, which sees Nepal as having great strategic significance because of its geographical position between India and China, has used the political instability and rise of Maoist forces in Nepal as levers to play a more direct role in its internal affairs. As a result, the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist (CPN–M) was declared a 'terrorist organization' at the end of April this year, even though they were formally implementing a ceasefire and working out negotiations with the government.
The US government has signed a five-year agreement with the Nepali government 'for cooperation in fighting terrorism and preventing possible terror attacks'. Military aid has been increased, in terms of both financial aid and hardware, along with training of Nepali armed forces. Within Nepal, such support by the US effectively strengthens the hand of the monarchy, which has traditionally relied upon and been associated with the dominantly royalist military.
The Indian government, too, has more or less declared its partisanship in the matter of the internal politics of Nepal. This of course fits in with India's current cosying up to Washington in foreign policy. It is true that Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee occasionally makes feeble and deliberately ineffectual appeals to restore a multi-party system in Nepal, even while 'congratulating' the new Prime Minster on his appointment. But in effect, the Indian government has been providing a substantial amount of military aid to Nepal, which tilts the scales in favour of the monarchy in the current situation.
However, such external support to the monarchy is unlikely to make Nepal a more stable place in the near future, simply because the forces making for discontent are pervasive and powerful. Nepal remains dominantly a poor agrarian economy, and there has been very little in terms of either structural change or substantial development that could have caused shifts in the pattern of employment or in labour productivity in general. Poverty is widespread; the Nepal Living Standards Survey (1995–96) found 42 per cent of the population to be below the poverty line (44 per cent of urban and 23 per cent of rural population). The difference between Kathmandu and the rest of Nepal, including other urban areas, is very marked: the poverty ratio in the urban Kathmandu Valley was estimated to be only 4 per cent. While open unemployment is low, underemployment (or disguised unemployment) is officially estimated to be as high as a little more than 45 per cent of total person-days.
Much the same as in several other South Asian countries, economic growth in Nepal did not translate into poverty declines or improvements in living standards of the masses. Instead, inequalities are said to have increased substantially, even by World Bank estimates. Most of Nepal's 20 million people are subsistence peasants, who have experienced little or no improvement in their material conditions. Such a situation has therefore facilitated the spread of Maoist insurgency in Nepal.
Economic conditions too have deteriorated in the recent past. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, the economy contracted by 0.63 per cent in the 12 months to July 2002. The 'modern' sector has been especially badly hit. Trade, manufacturing output and tourism all declined by 11, 10 and 27 per cent respectively. The carpet industry that employed 550,000 workers in 1992 was down to half that size in 2002. The garment sector's workforce of around 70,000 in the mid-1990s has also been halved over the past few years. A report published in May this year estimated that out of 300,000 to 350,000 youth who enter the job market annually, only 10 per cent find work.
Some of this was actually the direct result of World Bank-style neo-liberal market-oriented reforms that have caused trade liberalization, privatization and reduction or removal of subsidies, including subsidies on food. These were not only counterproductive in terms of making it more difficult for the nascent industries to survive, but they also hit directly at agriculture and were insensitive to the requirements of a large subsistence-based pattern of cultivation. As a result, Nepal is now reduced to being a food-importer, whereas earlier it was mostly self-sufficient in grain.
In such a context, it is hardly surprising that social unrest is so high and increasing. Apart from the Maoist insurgency, there are other indications of the growing alienation and unhappiness of ordinary people. An attempt to raise petroleum prices by 65 per cent caused largescale demonstrations in Kathmandu. In mid-June, bonded labourers took to the streets demanding equitable resettlement, which has still not been granted.
It is clear that the possibilities for social, political and economic stability are still very distant as far as Nepal is concerned, and so are the chances for more egalitarian and democratic growth. Moreover, interference by outside powers, including India, may in fact contribute to prolonging the agony of the country.
Nepal is a very young electoral democracy, emerging after a 'People's Movement' (in which all the main political parties were involved) agitated successfully to replace King Birendra's rule with a multi-party political system, in the early 1990s. But the experience with electoral democracy thus far has been volatile: since then Nepal has been through three general elections, eight governments and seven Prime Ministers. In addition, the Maoist insurgency that eschews parliamentary politics in favour of violent struggle, has gained substantial ground since 1996, and controls large swathes of territory across different parts of the country.
The relationship between the King and the elected politicians in Nepal has always been tense, and has deteriorated further after the reign of King Birendra. King Gyanendra (brother of Birendra) came to reign in the year 2001, after the mysterious and bloody massacre in which the then Crown Prince Dipendra was reported to have killed most of his family. Gyanendra too has indicated his lack of patience with the niceties and messiness of electoral democracy, and his preference for more 'directed' rule.
General elections were due in November 2002; instead of allowing the elections to happen, King Gyanendra exploited the infighting and chaos in the then ruling Nepali Congress by dismissing the Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba in October, and giving himself executive powers. The man installed as the puppet Prime Minister was a loyal monarchist, who was appointed without any consultation with other political parties. The King also favoured a more aggressively militaristic response to the Maoist insurgents, rather than political dialogue.
However, this situation proved to be completely unstable, and political instability as well as growing violence between the army and insurgents disrupted the life of the citizens and the peasantry in particular. The loyalist Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand, became the focus of opposition attacks, especially as the talks with the Maoists proved to be fruitless despite the ceasefire. Five political parties – the Communist Party of Nepal–Unified Marxist Leninist (UML), the Nepali Congress (NC), the Nepal Workers Party, the People's Front of Nepal and the Sadbhavana Party – all demanded that Lokendra Bahadur Chand resign and that the King reconvene parliament or hold fresh elections under an interim government of all parties.
Weeks of protest culminated in the resignation of Prime Minister Chand in May. However, once again King Gyanendra effectively spoiled the possibilities of a solution to the conflict. The King called on opposition parties to submit the name of a replacement. But when they proposed UML secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal, the King ignored them and instead appointed Thapa, leader of the rightwing royalist National Democratic Party (RPP).
Thapa appealed to the other parties to join his government but was turned down. Instead, there has been a groundswell of protests, organized by politicians of opposition parties, against the King's undemocratic tendencies, and the Maoist party has also declared its dissatisfaction. The month of June was marked by numerous demonstrations, and in July too there have been a number of incidents of protest. This government is therefore not likely to last, primarily because of the domestic chaos that it has generated. It is clear that King Gyanendra's ability to ignore popular opinion within his own country is based on the support that he receives from abroad, especially from the US and Indian governments.
The Bush administration, which sees Nepal as having great strategic significance because of its geographical position between India and China, has used the political instability and rise of Maoist forces in Nepal as levers to play a more direct role in its internal affairs. As a result, the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist (CPN–M) was declared a 'terrorist organization' at the end of April this year, even though they were formally implementing a ceasefire and working out negotiations with the government.
The US government has signed a five-year agreement with the Nepali government 'for cooperation in fighting terrorism and preventing possible terror attacks'. Military aid has been increased, in terms of both financial aid and hardware, along with training of Nepali armed forces. Within Nepal, such support by the US effectively strengthens the hand of the monarchy, which has traditionally relied upon and been associated with the dominantly royalist military.
The Indian government, too, has more or less declared its partisanship in the matter of the internal politics of Nepal. This of course fits in with India's current cosying up to Washington in foreign policy. It is true that Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee occasionally makes feeble and deliberately ineffectual appeals to restore a multi-party system in Nepal, even while 'congratulating' the new Prime Minster on his appointment. But in effect, the Indian government has been providing a substantial amount of military aid to Nepal, which tilts the scales in favour of the monarchy in the current situation.
However, such external support to the monarchy is unlikely to make Nepal a more stable place in the near future, simply because the forces making for discontent are pervasive and powerful. Nepal remains dominantly a poor agrarian economy, and there has been very little in terms of either structural change or substantial development that could have caused shifts in the pattern of employment or in labour productivity in general. Poverty is widespread; the Nepal Living Standards Survey (1995–96) found 42 per cent of the population to be below the poverty line (44 per cent of urban and 23 per cent of rural population). The difference between Kathmandu and the rest of Nepal, including other urban areas, is very marked: the poverty ratio in the urban Kathmandu Valley was estimated to be only 4 per cent. While open unemployment is low, underemployment (or disguised unemployment) is officially estimated to be as high as a little more than 45 per cent of total person-days.
Much the same as in several other South Asian countries, economic growth in Nepal did not translate into poverty declines or improvements in living standards of the masses. Instead, inequalities are said to have increased substantially, even by World Bank estimates. Most of Nepal's 20 million people are subsistence peasants, who have experienced little or no improvement in their material conditions. Such a situation has therefore facilitated the spread of Maoist insurgency in Nepal.
Economic conditions too have deteriorated in the recent past. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, the economy contracted by 0.63 per cent in the 12 months to July 2002. The 'modern' sector has been especially badly hit. Trade, manufacturing output and tourism all declined by 11, 10 and 27 per cent respectively. The carpet industry that employed 550,000 workers in 1992 was down to half that size in 2002. The garment sector's workforce of around 70,000 in the mid-1990s has also been halved over the past few years. A report published in May this year estimated that out of 300,000 to 350,000 youth who enter the job market annually, only 10 per cent find work.
Some of this was actually the direct result of World Bank-style neo-liberal market-oriented reforms that have caused trade liberalization, privatization and reduction or removal of subsidies, including subsidies on food. These were not only counterproductive in terms of making it more difficult for the nascent industries to survive, but they also hit directly at agriculture and were insensitive to the requirements of a large subsistence-based pattern of cultivation. As a result, Nepal is now reduced to being a food-importer, whereas earlier it was mostly self-sufficient in grain.
In such a context, it is hardly surprising that social unrest is so high and increasing. Apart from the Maoist insurgency, there are other indications of the growing alienation and unhappiness of ordinary people. An attempt to raise petroleum prices by 65 per cent caused largescale demonstrations in Kathmandu. In mid-June, bonded labourers took to the streets demanding equitable resettlement, which has still not been granted.
It is clear that the possibilities for social, political and economic stability are still very distant as far as Nepal is concerned, and so are the chances for more egalitarian and democratic growth. Moreover, interference by outside powers, including India, may in fact contribute to prolonging the agony of the country.
© MACROSCAN 2003