MacroScan (Printable Version)

The horrific terrorist attacks in Mumbai have evoked some responses from the country’s elite that are unnerving in their open class bias and almost as horrifying in terms of what they portend for the future of the country. The appalling nature of the electronic media’s engagement with the events of late November has already been much commented on: the sheer irresponsibility and insensitivity, the competitive sensationalism and subsequent aggressive jingoism and open war-mongering of so much of the coverage.

Even so, one point needs to be reiterated – the complete inanity of the slogan “war on terror” that is now being trotted out by our media in slavish imitation of the Bush regime in the US. Terror is a tactic, and therefore cannot be an enemy per se; it is used by different enemies and requires preventive tactics in response. Therefore to declare a war on terror suggests a complete absence of the logical thinking that is required to prevent the use of terror as a tactic.

Of course the English language media in particular reflect all the prejudices and reactions of the elite. As a result, their responses unfortunately have to be taken seriously, if only because they continue to have so much disproportionate voice and power in the Indian establishment. One particular response that is increasingly being expressed through such media is especially disconcerting: the push for the privatisation of security.

Business honchos and rich people generally have suddenly realised, because of the attacks on the five star hotels in Mumbai, that they cannot insulate themselves from the general loss of physical security that has been the lot of the average less-privileged Indian for some time now. The related outcry has focussed on their own protection, rather than on the obvious need to provide public security for all. And the demands have centred on the form this protection should take – increasingly a private form.

“Give us guns, India Inc demands from government” ran one headline. A top executive in a major software company argued “If the government is unable to protect us, then amend the law. Let us bear arms, we'll protect ourselves to whatever extent we can”. Others demanded that their personal and corporate security guards be allowed to carry automatic weapons like AK-47s. A famous actor expressed his lack of faith in the official security system and said he would have to ensure his own protection.

At one level, this is not all that surprising. The Indian elite, like its counterparts across the world, has generally accepted in toto the mantra that private provision is always better, for everything from transport and education to basic utilities. And with its long tradition of hierarchy, the Indian elite has always been more than comfortable with the social differentiation and inequality that is a natural consequence of such private provision. So the argument that is often made against such privatisation of security, that it is fundamentally unjust and would make personal safety a function of the individual’s bank account, is not likely to cut much ice with those whose sensibilities have already been hardened to fine quality.

But there are other, more real and pressing concerns with private security, that should make its protagonists even among the Indian elite stop and think. The most fundamental concern is that private security does not really increase security; in fact it may actually make things worse. It creates enormous tensions about the role and legitimacy of governments vis-à-vis individual “armies”. And it undermines the basic purpose of security by making violence appear to be the instrument of choice. This can even create an internal arms race between contending groups.

The most obvious expressions of such tensions are to be found in areas where security has effectively been fully privatised, whether in warlord-controlled Somalia or tracts of rural Bihar where landlord-run forces clash with extremist groups claiming to represent the underprivileged.

But such tensions are increasingly being felt even in developed countries like the US, where the past decade has seen a significant increase in the outsourcing of security functions by the federal and state governments. This is of course sharply evident in Iraq, where employees of security agencies like Blackstone have been involved in numerous atrocities and show major problems of inadequate accountability.

Even central intelligence (spying) functions in the US have been outsourced, with the value of intelligence contracts awarded to private agencies more than doubling from $18 billion in 1995 to $42 billion in 2005. This amounted to more than 70 per cent of the classified intelligence budget of the US government. What is more remarkable is that some of the most sensitive and strategic issues related to national security in the US are now handled by private agencies.

For example, private companies working for profit now collect and analyse the information collected by satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles, and write the reports that will be used by senior government officials. They supply and maintain the software and related services to manipulate data to track terrorist suspects. They even suggest the targets to hit in what are described as “terrorist hot spots” in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Pakistan. In fact, several of the air strikes that are known to have killed innocent civilians in western Pakistan have been the result of information passed on by these private agencies.

Paradoxically, the privatisation of security that is now so evident in the US and some other countries also runs counter to the declared integrative goals of globalisation, which is something that its protagonists otherwise usually support. This is because it creates highly differentiated systems with varying levels of protection, with isolated pockets of security in a broader context of large information and security gaps that actually render the pockets themselves less secure.

As Robert Mandel (The privatisation of security, 2001, http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/mar01/) points out “Security privatisation appears to have a greater potential than other forms of privatisation to lead to fragmentation rather than integration of the global community... Privatised security makes alliances, collective security and burden-sharing more difficult; threats to internal security more likely; arms control more porous, and predictable deterrence relationships more unstable. The spread of transnational criminal organisations, themselves using private enforcement systems motivated by profit rather than political gain, is completely in tune with the proliferation of privatised defensive measures taken against them. Gunrunners involved in clandestine arms transfers find privatised security forces a ready market for their wares. Because of the apolitical stance of privatised security forces, rogue states, terrorist groups, drug lords, and other unruly actors find means of coercion more readily available for their use than they would otherwise.”

This is ironic, because privatised security is essentially based on the perceived need to protect one’s own group, company or community. Yet this single-minded particularistic focus not only prevents any comprehension of the direct and ripple effects of the provision, but ends up encouraging responses that directly counter it. It is really not possible to create viable enclaves of peace – through gated communities, heavily fortified and protected spaces, extensive use of armed guards and such like – beyond a point, especially if these generate more violent tendencies in the wider social environment.

In addition, of course, simply because the private security industry is largely unregulated, it has been found that their employees tend to be undertrained, underpaid, inadequately vetted and often even unfit for the specific jobs they are assigned. In the US, private security guards have been charged with numerous crimes ranging from robbery to murder, and it has been found that many who fail aptitude or personality tests for the military or government intelligence easily find work with private security agencies. In India, private security companies pay their workers poorly and provide less than adequate working conditions, often with excessively long working hours, in the drive to cut costs and ensure greater profits.

So the elite of India seem to have got it wrong again, in thinking that they can ensure their own security by simply paying for it and ignoring the broader security of all citizens. But maybe it is this apparently complete absence of social responsibility on the part of our elite that has created the conditions for societal violence or terrorist attacks upon the people in the first place.



Themes > Current Issues	10.12.2008


Whose Security?

Jayati Ghosh

The horrific terrorist attacks in Mumbai have evoked some responses from the country’s elite that are unnerving in their open class bias and almost as horrifying in terms of what they portend for the future of the country. The appalling nature of the electronic media’s engagement with the events of late November has already been much commented on: the sheer irresponsibility and insensitivity, the competitive sensationalism and subsequent aggressive jingoism and open war-mongering of so much of the coverage. Even so, one point needs to be reiterated – the complete inanity of the slogan “war on terror” that is now being trotted out by our media in slavish imitation of the Bush regime in the US. Terror is a tactic, and therefore cannot be an enemy per se; it is used by different enemies and requires preventive tactics in response. Therefore to declare a war on terror suggests a complete absence of the logical thinking that is required to prevent the use of terror as a tactic. Of course the English language media in particular reflect all the prejudices and reactions of the elite. As a result, their responses unfortunately have to be taken seriously, if only because they continue to have so much disproportionate voice and power in the Indian establishment. One particular response that is increasingly being expressed through such media is especially disconcerting: the push for the privatisation of security. Business honchos and rich people generally have suddenly realised, because of the attacks on the five star hotels in Mumbai, that they cannot insulate themselves from the general loss of physical security that has been the lot of the average less-privileged Indian for some time now. The related outcry has focussed on their own protection, rather than on the obvious need to provide public security for all. And the demands have centred on the form this protection should take – increasingly a private form. “Give us guns, India Inc demands from government” ran one headline. A top executive in a major software company argued “If the government is unable to protect us, then amend the law. Let us bear arms, we'll protect ourselves to whatever extent we can”. Others demanded that their personal and corporate security guards be allowed to carry automatic weapons like AK-47s. A famous actor expressed his lack of faith in the official security system and said he would have to ensure his own protection. At one level, this is not all that surprising. The Indian elite, like its counterparts across the world, has generally accepted in toto the mantra that private provision is always better, for everything from transport and education to basic utilities. And with its long tradition of hierarchy, the Indian elite has always been more than comfortable with the social differentiation and inequality that is a natural consequence of such private provision. So the argument that is often made against such privatisation of security, that it is fundamentally unjust and would make personal safety a function of the individual’s bank account, is not likely to cut much ice with those whose sensibilities have already been hardened to fine quality. But there are other, more real and pressing concerns with private security, that should make its protagonists even among the Indian elite stop and think. The most fundamental concern is that private security does not really increase security; in fact it may actually make things worse. It creates enormous tensions about the role and legitimacy of governments vis-à-vis individual “armies”. And it undermines the basic purpose of security by making violence appear to be the instrument of choice. This can even create an internal arms race between contending groups. The most obvious expressions of such tensions are to be found in areas where security has effectively been fully privatised, whether in warlord-controlled Somalia or tracts of rural Bihar where landlord-run forces clash with extremist groups claiming to represent the underprivileged. But such tensions are increasingly being felt even in developed countries like the US, where the past decade has seen a significant increase in the outsourcing of security functions by the federal and state governments. This is of course sharply evident in Iraq, where employees of security agencies like Blackstone have been involved in numerous atrocities and show major problems of inadequate accountability. Even central intelligence (spying) functions in the US have been outsourced, with the value of intelligence contracts awarded to private agencies more than doubling from $18 billion in 1995 to $42 billion in 2005. This amounted to more than 70 per cent of the classified intelligence budget of the US government. What is more remarkable is that some of the most sensitive and strategic issues related to national security in the US are now handled by private agencies. For example, private companies working for profit now collect and analyse the information collected by satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles, and write the reports that will be used by senior government officials. They supply and maintain the software and related services to manipulate data to track terrorist suspects. They even suggest the targets to hit in what are described as “terrorist hot spots” in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Pakistan. In fact, several of the air strikes that are known to have killed innocent civilians in western Pakistan have been the result of information passed on by these private agencies. Paradoxically, the privatisation of security that is now so evident in the US and some other countries also runs counter to the declared integrative goals of globalisation, which is something that its protagonists otherwise usually support. This is because it creates highly differentiated systems with varying levels of protection, with isolated pockets of security in a broader context of large information and security gaps that actually render the pockets themselves less secure. As Robert Mandel (The privatisation of security, 2001, http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/mar01/) points out “Security privatisation appears to have a greater potential than other forms of privatisation to lead to fragmentation rather than integration of the global community... Privatised security makes alliances, collective security and burden-sharing more difficult; threats to internal security more likely; arms control more porous, and predictable deterrence relationships more unstable. The spread of transnational criminal organisations, themselves using private enforcement systems motivated by profit rather than political gain, is completely in tune with the proliferation of privatised defensive measures taken against them. Gunrunners involved in clandestine arms transfers find privatised security forces a ready market for their wares. Because of the apolitical stance of privatised security forces, rogue states, terrorist groups, drug lords, and other unruly actors find means of coercion more readily available for their use than they would otherwise.” This is ironic, because privatised security is essentially based on the perceived need to protect one’s own group, company or community. Yet this single-minded particularistic focus not only prevents any comprehension of the direct and ripple effects of the provision, but ends up encouraging responses that directly counter it. It is really not possible to create viable enclaves of peace – through gated communities, heavily fortified and protected spaces, extensive use of armed guards and such like – beyond a point, especially if these generate more violent tendencies in the wider social environment. In addition, of course, simply because the private security industry is largely unregulated, it has been found that their employees tend to be undertrained, underpaid, inadequately vetted and often even unfit for the specific jobs they are assigned. In the US, private security guards have been charged with numerous crimes ranging from robbery to murder, and it has been found that many who fail aptitude or personality tests for the military or government intelligence easily find work with private security agencies. In India, private security companies pay their workers poorly and provide less than adequate working conditions, often with excessively long working hours, in the drive to cut costs and ensure greater profits. So the elite of India seem to have got it wrong again, in thinking that they can ensure their own security by simply paying for it and ignoring the broader security of all citizens. But maybe it is this apparently complete absence of social responsibility on the part of our elite that has created the conditions for societal violence or terrorist attacks upon the people in the first place.


© MACROSCAN 2008