SDRM: Debt Restructuring or Liquidation?

Jan 2nd 2003, C.P. Chandrasekhar, Jayati Ghosh &
Smitha Francis

Even as the Bretton Woods Institutions are opposed to  reform of the international financial architecture to prevent crises, they are ardently searching for ways to deal with the fallout of crises on sovereign debt. C.P. Chandrasekhar, Jayati Ghosh and Smitha Francis examine the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) advocated by the IMF, discuss the factors that motivate those advocating it and assess the likely consequences of its implementation.

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