The latest Human Development Report
from the UNDP raises some important questions about true
democracy and voice, but does not go far enough in
identifying the some of the major obstacles to democracy
in the world today, or the means to achieve it.
The
Human Development Reports annually published by the UNDP
have, over the years, tended to provide at least some
kind of counterbalancing analysis to the oppressively
neoliberal and often misleading publications of the
World Bank and IMF. They have also managed each year, to
identify a theme, which is not just topical and
relevant, but quite crucial to the interests of a
significant majority of the world’s population.
This year’s Report, which is entitled "Deepening
democracy in a fragmented world", deals with an issue
that is ever more important, because while formal
democracy has extended in many parts of the world over
the recent period, substantive democracy - in terms of
more equal opportunities and the power of the people’s
will - currently seems under greater threat. The HDR
makes a similar observation: "Economically, politically
and technologically, the world has never seemed more
free – or more unjust."
The HDR elucidates this statement at three levels.
First, while there is more formal democracy than ever
before, in terms of the majority of the world’s regimes
now being electoral democracies, this is still a long
way from comprehensive civil and political freedom for
the citizens or accountability of the governments.
Second, there are many more economic opportunities
across the world, but a huge share of the world’ s
population is still denied access to them. In fact, in
the developing world, the seemingly intractable problems
of persistent income poverty and high rates of child
mortality point to the absence of international economic
democracy. Third, while wars between nations are less
frequent, civil conflicts of various kinds are on the
increase.
The HDR also makes the point that the link between
democracy and human development of the citizens is not
automatic: in fact, when a small elite dominates
economic and political decisions, the link between
democracy can be broken. But most significant of all,
the Report recognises what is probably the greatest
symptom of "democratic deficit" in the world today:
"Citizens often feel powerless to influence national
policies … subject to international forces that they
have little capacity to control".
This, indeed, is the real rub – the absence of genuine
political voice and the inability to control especially
economic policies on the part of the majority of the
people, which has become such a standard feature of
almost all democracies, old and new, across the world.
But while the HDR identifies this problem, it does not
take the further step of asking what has caused this, or
really addressing the issue of what can be done about
it.
It must be accepted that the perception of lack of
genuine people’s power is not new. Some would argue that
the distinction between formal and substantive democracy
itself indicates that we are living in more luxurious
times, politically speaking, than before through most of
history. Yet, there is an important sense in which
people across the world feel – and actually are - less
genuinely empowered than they were, say, at the middle
of the last century, or even two decades ago.
This greater sense of powerlessness is not an accident.
It is the result of a large process whereby it is truly
the case that democratic processes have much less
control over the policy decisions that are so critical
in shaping people’s social and material lives. The most
important shift that has taken place in practically all
the countries of the world over the past two decades, is
that the balance of social, political and economic power
has shifted comprehensively in favour of large capital
vis-à-vis all other groups.
This shift in power is both assisted by and reflected in
the various forms of liberalisation and deregulation
that have fed into the current process of globalisation.
This has contributed greatly to the enhanced mobility of
large capital and also to its bargaining power, and has
been associated with the greater fragility and
vulnerability that other sections of societies – and
particularly workers – feel. And this process is not
confined only to poor and developing countries; rather,
it is widespread across the developed industrial world,
where common people increasingly feel alienated from the
governing political classes and unable to influence
policies in ways that they desire.
More and more empirical studies (except for those
blatantly funded by and subservient to the interests of
large multinational capital) argue quite convincingly
that global deregulation of trade and capital markets
have increased inequality and reduced economic
democracy. This is because they have reduced the power
of national government to meet the social and economic
needs to people in terms of basic physical and social
infrastructure spending, limited serious efforts at
poverty reduction and universal provision of basic
services, and increased the vulnerability of ordinary
people to sharp income shocks and other such
fluctuations.
And yet, no one seems to be able to do anything to
persuade, force or otherwise influence governments into
changing these policies and the associated international
structures and institutions that push them. The problem
is now an intense one, at both national and
international levels – how do people in general gain
influence over major policies which affect them
dramatically, but seemed designed dominantly to cater to
large and often multinational
capital?
In India, for example, it is quite clear to anyone who
cares to see it, that the strategy of neo-liberal
economic reform has not found favour with most of the
electorate, for the simple reason that they have not
gained – and many have even lost – because of it. Yet
successive governments who have replaced those thrown
out by the electorate, have come in and done more of the
same, disregarding all the signals that voters can send
out. The causes are obviously complex and depend on the
specific political economy context. But it could be
argued that in India (as indeed in several other
developing countries) a substantial section of the
elites and middles classes now see their interests as
more closely tied to those of international capital,
than with the rest of their own country’s population.
The problem is probably evident in its starkest form in
Latin America today. Across the region, people have done
everything they possibly can to indicate their distress
at the effects and their rejection of neoliberal
economic policies. They have demonstrated peacefully (if
noisily) night after day on the streets in Argentina;
gone on massive nationwide strikes in Peru; voted for
the man blacklisted by the US for his support for
cocaine growers in Bolivia; rioted in Paraguay;
indicated their intention of voting in alternative
government in Brazil; and so on. Nevertheless, the
chronicle of even further neoliberal reform, of budget
surpluses to add to the woes of depression, of further
cuts in workers wages and pensions, of more job losses
as part of "necessary" belt-tightening, continues.
Sometimes the blatant disregard of popular will, often
due to external pressure, assumes obscene proportions.
In Argentina, a law which allowed foreign banks to be
charged for illegally transferring large amounts of
money out of the country in the midst of the crisis, had
to be repealed after the IMF insisted on it. In Bolivia
the dissident native candidate who came second in the
election, receiving more than one-third of the vote
despite the open displeasure of the US government, has
been denied any voice in the government and in important
policy matters. In Uruguay, the government has frozen
bank deposits of local residents for three years, and
allowed foreign financiers to take their money out.
In Brazil, the popular leftwing candidate Luis da Silva
(Lula) - the frontrunner in the Presidential elections
to be held in September - was forced to declare his
acceptance of a largely IMF-determined policy stance
after persistent speculative attacks and capital flight
demolished the value of the real and even
threatened his candidature. Now the IMF has come up with
a carrot after the stick has played its role. It has
just promised the next government $30 billion over 15
months, so long as the new government promises to
continue the economic policies of the current one, which
have absolutely no popular support.
But again, the problem is not confined to developing
countries. Across Europe, supposedly left-of-centre
governments that found themselves following rightwing
economic policies because of supposed economic or
financial compulsions, have already been thrown out of
power or are on the verge of it. Even so, the chances
are that the new government will not offer relief to the
people in terms of changed economic strategy; if
anything they are likely to enforce even harsher
conditions on the economic security of most of the
citizens. In the United States, the popular legitimacy
of the both political and economic institutions of
capitalism has never been weaker; yet the US
administration continues to pursue policies that
strengthen large capital at the expense of others.
So, if we really are concerned about genuine democracy,
clearly the most important item on the agenda must be to
restore to ordinary people some degree of control over
the economic policies which are today causing great
instability and potentially wreaking havoc over most of
their lives. Of course the other issues pertaining to
democracy, as highlighted by the HDR, are critical, and
much in need of attention. But the real democratic
deficit at present is reflected in the greater power,
nationally and internationally, of large capital in
various forms. It is curbing that power which must the
primary goal of all true democrats today.
|